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RETHINKING BODY PROPERTY
KARA W. SWANSON *
ABSTRACT

Body products, including blood, gametes, and kidneys, are a routine part of contemporary medicine. They are also controversial. There is a strong preference for donated gifts,
based on an intuition that gifts are pure, altruistic, and healthy, and that purchased products (commodities) are tainted, exploitative, and dangerous. Law and policy reflect this
dichotomy, preventing market exchanges either by declaring body products non-property or
banning sales by the supplying body. Yet with growing scarcity leading to injustice in the
allocation and harvesting of body products, calls to allow sales have been increasing, motivating proposals to increase supplies by compensating bone marrow and breast milk suppliers.
This Article contributes to these pressing debates in two ways. First, it uses original
historical research to demonstrate that the morally inflected gift/commodity dichotomy is a
historical artifact, neither universal nor inevitable, and thus need not be the assumed basis
for law and policy. Second, in a novel use of the intellectual history of property, it brings
body products for the first time into the framework of recent progressive property scholarship to rethink body property.
The first body products, disembodied breast milk and blood, entered medicine at the
turn of the twentieth century. I argue that for a half century, these body products were
property-in-action, bought and sold as a means to the medically defined ends of advancing
recipient and supplier health. The dichotomy and condemnation of sales emerged only later, as body products transitioned to property-at-law. I argue that the focus on supplier
compensation was not a needed correction to marketplace harms, as commonly assumed,
but rather a result of (i) medical opposition to single-payer health care, (ii) product liability
law, and (iii) racism. This transition, analyzed in light of historical trends in property theory, is revealed as a shift to a narrower understanding of body products as property, presumed to satisfy only the individual preferences of market participants.
Using this analysis, this Article offers guidance for rethinking body property. Exposing
body product exceptionalism within the law of property, this Article uses history to demonstrate how body products, like other forms of property, can have purposes beyond individual preference satisfaction. In place of regulation focused on banning market-alienability,
the law of body products as property can be theorized and rewritten to focus on the ends of
patient treatment and public health, incorporating the use of regulated markets to serve
the goals of increased access to medical treatment while also avoiding supplier exploitation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
People are not property. This statement, supported by the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery, was not always accurate.
That we can now take it as a basic principle of U.S. law is the result
of a bloody civil war fought to determine the legality of owning humans. 1 There is no similar blanket prohibition in law against people
as a source of property. To the contrary, the human body in the United States has always been a source of marketable property. Americans, like people since the ancient Roman Empire, have sold their
hair.2 Women have sold their breast milk as wet nurses, another centuries’-old form of self-commodification that persisted in the United

1. Although slavery has been outlawed in the United States, the legacy of race-based
slavery continues to permeate U.S. law, politics, society, and culture, including the subject
of this Article: property sourced from human bodies. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK
MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 22-23, 193-211 (2006) (arguing that
the legacy of racialized slavery is used too often to prevent body product exchanges that
would promote the interest of African Americans); Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 8, 9 (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) [hereinafter Radin & Sunder, Introduction] (“The
Thirteenth Amendment forms the backdrop of these cases.”).
2. E.g., Elizabeth Bartman, Hair and the Artifice of Roman Female Adornment, 105
AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 1, 1-2 (2001); Mary K. Gayne, Illicit Wigmaking in EighteenthCentury Paris, 38 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 119, 121-22 (2004). The prevalence of the
practice in the United States is evidenced in popular literature. See, e.g., LOUISA MAY
ALCOTT, LITTLE WOMEN 315-21 (The Floating Press 2009) (1869) (Jo March sells her hair
to raise money for her family.); O. HENRY, The Gift of the Magi, in THE COMPLETE EDITION
OF O. HENRY: THE FOUR MILLION 15, 17-18 (1906 ed.) (Della sells her hair to buy her husband a Christmas present.).
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States through the early twentieth century. 3 Even after the ban on
slavery, propertization of body parts continued to be seen as lawful
and appropriate. Twentieth-century medical advances led to an expansion of possible body property as doctors offered people money for
their blood, flesh, organs, and gametes, accompanied by a thriving
trade in products harvested from cadavers.4
Despite this long history of buying and selling products sourced
from the human body, it is intensely controversial in law and society
to consider human body products as property in the twenty-first century, and particularly to buy and sell such products. In recent years,
the federal government has fought a proposal to offer limited compensation to bone marrow suppliers in order to address the shortage
of donors of non-northern European ancestry.5 Responding to advances in transplanting faces and hands, federal regulators also
moved to expand the reach of the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA), the federal law banning the sale of human organs, by redefining “organ” to include hands and faces and thus banning compensation to families making cadaveric donations of these body parts. 6
Breastfeeding activists in Detroit, Michigan, waged a public campaign against the Mother’s Milk Cooperative which offered to buy
breast milk at $1 per ounce, arguing that “breast milk is priceless”7
and disparaging “[m]others pumping just for profit.” 8

3. See generally VALERIE FILDES, WET NURSING: A HISTORY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE
PRESENT (1988); JANET GOLDEN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WET NURSING IN AMERICA: FROM
BREAST TO BOTTLE (1996).
4. ANNIE CHENEY, BODY BROKERS: INSIDE AMERICA’S UNDERGROUND TRADE IN
HUMAN REMAINS (2006); GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 111-12 (noting that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act does not preclude payments for organs and body parts used in research);
SUSAN E. LEDERER, FLESH AND BLOOD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND BLOOD
TRANSFUSION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2008); KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON
THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK, AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA (2014). While
this Article does not address cadavers themselves as property, entire bodies too have had
value in medical marketplaces in Europe and North America, sought by doctors wanting to
teach and learn anatomy and surgery. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
5. See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a), (c) (2012); see also Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,033-42 (July 3, 2013) (amending 42 C.F.R. pt. 121) (final rule
issued by the Department of Health and Human Services incorporating expanded definition of “organ”); Liz Kowalczyk, The Future of Face and Hand Transplants, BOS. GLOBE
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2014/03/16/organtransplant-leaders-creating-national-system-allocate-hands-faces-disfigured-patients/
h0VLdmJ7S4CGIUjHIEYEIO/story.html [https://perma.cc/S47F-JXHY].
7. Mahira Ali, Comment to An Open Letter to Medolac Laboratories from Detroit Mothers, BLACK M OTHERS ’ B REAST F EEDING ASS ’ N (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://blackmothersbreastfeeding.org/2015/01/open-letter-to-medolac-laboratories-from-detroitmothers/ [https://perma.cc/V2R8-2UD7].
8. Darlene Henderson, Comment to An Open Letter to Medolac Laboratories from
Detroit Mothers, supra note 7; see also Kim Kozlowski, Activists: Breast Milk Corp. Targeting Black Moms, THE DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/
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Doctors, the general public, and lawmakers consider the divide
between body products as gifts, transferred by their suppliers without compensation, and body products as commodities, transferred for
compensation, as sharp and significant. The gift vs. commodity dichotomy is understood in terms of a moral hierarchy in which gifts
are pure, altruistic, and good, and commodities are tainted, exploitative, and bad. 9 As medical science offers new hope and healing
through the use of body products, both American law and society prefer to categorize such products as “gifts” and “donations,” rather than
as property or marketable goods. 10
What has been nearly forgotten in these controversies is that, like
the ban on humans as property, the legal and social status of humansourced property is neither universal nor immutable, but rather a
historically contingent construct. Using original historical research
into the first body products routinely used in medicine, breast milk
and blood, this Article demonstrates that a century ago, body products were matter-of-factly treated as property and bought and sold by
suppliers, patients, and doctors in Detroit and elsewhere. Further, it
reveals that the current focus on the divide between gifts and commodities did not exist in first half-century of the exciting developments that brought body products into the mainstream of medicine.11
That dichotomy, now the frame for current policy debates, was itself
a late twentieth-century development.
This Article argues that it is critical to understand this history
and to rethink body property in order to establish an improved legal
framework for obtaining and allocating body products. Our current
laws assume the significance of the gift vs. commodity dichotomy and
the truth of the standard narrative of good gifts and bad sales. The
dichotomous approach to body products and markets is both shopworn and actively harmful, leading to injustice in both the supply
and allocation of many body products. 12 At a time when the scarcity
story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/01/12/detroit-breast-feeding-activists-protest-co-op/
21675583/ [https://perma.cc/ZM2J-HMRP].
9. The origins of this dichotomy and hierarchy are explained in Part V infra.
10. I am using property as a broader category than commodity. In my usage, property
is both a legal and theoretical category and includes market-alienable property and market-inalienable property. I am using commodity to refer to property exchangeable in markets, and “marketization” in preference to “commoditization” to refer to the process of becoming exchangeable in markets. The terms “commodity,” “commodification,” and “marketization” are discussed in the work of Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface:
Freedom, Equality, and the Many Futures of Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 1, at 1, 2-3 [hereinafter Ertman & Williams, Preface].
11. As discussed further in Part II infra, I use the term “body products” to refer to
material sourced from the human body, a category that includes both renewable and nonrenewable body products, as well as products sourced from living bodies and from cadavers.
12. The harms of body product scarcity and resulting gray and black markets have
been explored by legal scholars and other social scientists, most prominently with respect
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of body products is limiting the ability of Americans to access needed
treatment, this Article uses history first to denaturalize the dichotomy and the standard narrative and then to rethink body property to
provide a fresh basis for thinking about the law and policy of body
products. 13 In place of a focus on marketization through supplier
payment, this Article offers a historically grounded understanding of
body products as property to rethink the relationship between body
products and markets in theory and practice. 14
Today the belief that gifted body products are superior to sold
products is explained in terms of protecting supplier and recipient
health. Payment to suppliers is understood as the source of harm to
both parties. It is argued that payment incentivizes suppliers to sell
body products despite resulting damage to their own health, and/or
to sell body products despite a medical history that indicates that
their body product might be harmful to the recipient’s health. These
arguments are often accompanied by arguments that considering
body products as property, and particularly as what Margaret Radin

to organs, where scarcity is increasing and life-threatening. See, e.g., MARK J. CHERRY,
KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS, TRANSPLANTATION, AND THE MARKET (2005);
GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 184-90; JAMES STACEY TAYLOR, STAKES AND KIDNEYS: WHY
MARKETS IN HUMAN BODY PARTS ARE MORALLY IMPERATIVE (2005); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 435-36 n.392 (2000). For arguments
that despite scarcity, organ sales are too harmful to be allowed, see, for example, Alexander M. Capron, Six Decades of Organ Donation and the Challenges that Shifting the United States to a Market System Would Create Around the World, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 25, 51-58 (2014); Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price
of Progress, 107 PUB. INT. 65, 70-71 (1992).
13. This project thus joins work in sociology that has demonstrated the absence of a
divide in lived experience between market and non-market, another way of denaturalizing
the gift versus commodity dichotomy. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD:
THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF
INTIMACY (2005) [hereinafter ZELIZER, PURCHASE OF INTIMACY]; VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE
SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY: PIN MONEY, PAYCHECKS, POOR RELIEF, AND OTHER
CURRENCIES (1994). For an explanation of Zelizer’s work and its influence on scholarship
outside of sociology, see Martha M. Ertman, For Both Love and Money: Viviana Zelizer’s
The Purchase of Intimacy, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1017 (2009) [hereinafter Ertman, For
Both Love and Money]. Zelizer’s insights have been applied to late twentieth-century and
early twenty-first-century body product exchange in RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE
MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 126-33 (2011); KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS:
ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD AND ORGANS 11-12, 14, 25-27 (2006).
14. As discussed in Part III infra, the need to address questions of property related to
body products has been long acknowledged by the courts and scholars. See, e.g., Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-97 (Cal. 1990); E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY
PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996);
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX,
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 125-26 (1996) [hereinafter RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES]; Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 201
(2000); Stephen R. Munzer, Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts, 6 CANADIAN
J.L. & JURIS. 319, 319-20 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957, 966 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]; Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 EMORY L.J. 549, 552-54 (2013).
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calls “market-alienable” property, is inherently damaging to the dignity and value of all humans. 15
History teaches that while earlier actors were also focused on supplier and recipient health, they understood the relationship between
payment to suppliers and such harms very differently. Using a law
and society approach, I examine milk and blood as body products in
the first decades of their use as property-in-action, following doctors
managing body product exchanges in order to treat patients before
such products were considered potential property-at-law. I argue that
the historical evidence shows two assumptions underlying early body
product sales: (1) body products should be treated as property and (2)
the purposes of propertization appropriately included (a) the maintenance of a safe and adequate supply of body products to treat patients,
(b) a means of allocating that supply based on medical need rather
than the ability to pay market rates, and, often, (c) promoting public
health goals through forms of compensation offered to suppliers and
their families. Operating on these assumptions, rather than on the assumption that sales were inherently different from and inferior to
gifts, doctors bought and sold human milk and blood for a half-century.
Only at the mid-twentieth century did the focus on banning supplier
compensation emerge. I use history to demonstrate that the negative
perception of supplier compensation arose out of the opposition of the
medical profession to government-funded health care, developments in
product liability law, and the racism of white Americans.
Having denaturalized the dichotomy by demonstrating that the
perceived link between supplier payment and medical harms is far
from inevitable or immutable, this Article also reconsiders the forgotten past of body products as exchangeable property to argue that the
crucial question that should guide the market alienability of body
products is the nature of body products as property. Previous scholars have identified a dialectic in American property law between two
understandings of property: commodity versus propriety. 16 Property
15. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 16-29; Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1849-51 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, MarketInalienability]. For a more detailed articulation of the harms of commodification, including

harms of corruption and damage to personhood, see generally, for example, RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY:
THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); RICHARD M TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP:
FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997) (1970).
Note that this broad-brush description of the standard narrative and perceived dangers of
commodification glosses over considerable nuance in the scholarship regarding property,
personhood, and markets. In addition to the sources cited here, see RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 1 (an edited collection of scholarship exploring these issues);
Ertman, For Both Love and Money, supra note 13 (reviewing influence of sociology of markets on family law and extending analysis to transfers of genetic material).
16. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997) [hereinafter ALEXANDER,
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as commodity (sometimes described as market property or liberal
property) understands property to be that which is traded in markets. Property as propriety (sometimes described as republican property or civic property) understands property by the purposes for
which it is created and exchanged, whether traded in markets or not.
Using the intellectual history of property theory, this Article argues that body products originated as a form of civic property and
that the gift/commodity dichotomy arose when the understanding of
body products as property narrowed to the market property view. It
thus joins progressive property scholars in arguing that the market
property view is damagingly constricting. 17 The early history of body
products as civic property-in-action provides a case study for thinking
more expansively about property. More specifically, this history provides a basis for rethinking body property once the gift/commodity
dichotomy has been decentered. In place of a regulatory approach
focused on market alienability, we can consider the ends of body
products as property, using the historical purposes of body product
exchanges as a starting point. While leaving a full theory of body
property for later work, I suggest lessons from history to guide further theorization and regulation based on a vision of body property
that is created and exchanged to ensure efficient access to safe body
products by all who need them for medical care and to promote a society in which overall health and well-being is enhanced.
I begin in Part II by describing the urgent need to rethink the law
and policy of body products, detailing the current law and the injustices in body product allocation and exchange that have arisen out of
reliance on the gift/commodity dichotomy and standard narrative. In
Part III, I demonstrate how scholarship, like current law, has been
constrained by the gift/commodity dichotomy. In a novel integration
of the intellectual history of property theory and commodification
scholarship, I identify the source of this constraint in a historically
contingent understanding of body property as market property, a
narrow view of property that reinforces the dichotomy and hinders
efforts to move beyond it. In Parts IV and V, I analyze the history of
body products. In Part IV, I explore body property in the absence of
the dichotomy during the first half the twentieth century, analyzing
body products as a form of medically created civic property-in-action.
COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY]; Gregory S. Alexander, Essay, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1260 (2014) [hereinafter Alexander,
Property’s Ends]. Other formulations of this dialectic emphasize Blackstonian property
versus a social-obligation norm of property. M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of
Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 193-94 (2010).
17. See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura
S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009). For
an overview of progressive property scholarship, see Ezra Rosser, Essay, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 109-110 (2013).
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Part V examines the transition to the gift/commodity dichotomy in
the mid- to late twentieth century, as body products became contested property-at-law. In Part VI, I use this reclaimed past to suggest
how historical facts on the ground and early medical visions can be
used as a basis for rethinking body property in law, by shifting regulatory focus from the means of body product creation (sale or gift) to
the ends of body products (patient treatment and public health).
II. CONTEMPORARY BODY PRODUCTS IN LAW AND POLICY
To understand how the gift/commodity dichotomy—regarded as a
moral hierarchy in which gifts are superior to sales—is harmfully
limiting the law and policy of body products, it is necessary to understand the contemporary supply and use of body products and the legal regimes that govern their exchange. This Part first traces the origins and contours of body product law and then summarizes recent
scholarship detailing the profound injustices in the present system of
creating and allocating many body products that exist despite laws
banning markets in certain body products.

A. Body Products and Law
In the twenty-first century, body products include renewable
products such as blood, milk, semen, bone marrow, and even feces,18
as well as nonrenewable products, like kidneys, oocytes (eggs), and
skin. 19 All these products, like hair, can be harvested from living bodies. Other body products are harvested from cadavers, like some kidneys, hearts, lungs, and faces. All body products, however, share the
feature that they have, in classic Marxist terminology, a use value
and an exchange value once separated from the source body (the
supplier). 20 The exchange value can be actualized in a transfer for
compensation by the supplier and/or in transfers by one or more middlemen that manage a supply chain between supplier and recipient.
18. Fecal transplants are being used to treat certain intestinal infections. OpenBiome,
in Massachusetts, is the first human stool bank. OPENBIOME, http://www.openbiome.org/
home/ [https://perma.cc/Q9EF-2RVA]; Peter Andrey Smith, A New Kind of Transplant
Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/health/a-new-kindof-transplant-bank.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2RKQ-YGSC].
19. For discussion of skin as a body product since the early twentieth century,
see L EDERER , supra note 4, at 6-20, and in the twenty-first century, see Render, supra note 14, at 550-51.
20. Ertman & Williams, Preface, supra note 10, at 2. Although I borrow from Marx’s
definition of “commodity,” I am using the term “body product” instead because “commodity”
has come to have a particular meaning in discussions surrounding what Kimberly Krawiec
calls “taboo trades,” which are associated with supplier compensation. Kimberly D.
Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1740 n.5, 1748 (2010); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i-xiv (2009). To the extent possible, I use the term “supplier”
rather than the more common term “donor” to avoid the connotation of unpaid gifting.
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This disembodied, valued material is what I am calling a body product. 21 This Article, like most of the contemporary debates about body
products, concentrates on body products with use value as medical
therapeutics for another person (the recipient).22 Such disembodied,
medically valued material can also result as a by-product of procedures performed for the benefit of the supplying body, such as biopsies and surgeries. While the use of what is sometimes called medical
“waste” raises distinct and significant legal issues about ownership
and allocation of perceived value, 23 I am concentrating on body products created in ways that have long been understood by the medical
profession as more problematic—taking material from a healthy body
for the purpose of aiding another patient, which is a challenge to a
foundational principle of medical ethics: to first do no harm.24
The production and use of body products in medicine is largely a
twentieth-century innovation, a result of the biomedical turn in understanding the human body. We take it for granted in the twentyfirst century that doctors and scientists look to the human body as a
source of therapeutics. In order to think of the human body as a
source of fungible products, however, doctors, scientists, and the lay
public needed to make a radical shift in their conception of the human body and in medical theory. In earlier centuries, the use of body
21. By focusing on disembodied material, I am excluding intellectual property, primarily patents, from my definition of body products. Patents can be obtained based on research using body products, and that patentability is the source of value of some body
products. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481-82 (Cal. 1990)
(spleen cells, as well as blood samples, used to create patented cell line); LORI
ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKINS, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE (2001); GOLD, supra note 14, at 138-41. I do not mean, however, by
my focus on the material to imply that the law and history of human-derived intellectual
property rights is divorced from the law and history of body products. My argument to the
contrary is explained in Kara W. Swanson, The Body as Slippery Object, 1900-2015 (July
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presented at the International Society for the History and Theory of Intellectual Property, University of Pennsylvania); see also
Stephen R. Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord Blood for
Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 540-44 (1999) [hereinafter Munzer, Special
Case] (linking patents derived from cord blood with analysis of blood itself as property).
22. The uses of body products are not limited to medical therapeutics. They have uses
in medical training (practicing surgical techniques), research, and safety testing (crash
testing). The Article focuses on uses in direct patient treatment, although the framework
outlined herein can be extended to consider other uses. A more detailed discussion of the
use of body products is provided in ROHAN HARDCASTLE, LAW AND THE HUMAN BODY:
PROPERTY RIGHTS, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 3-12, 78-96 (2007).
23. See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92; Hannah Landecker, Immortality, In Vitro: A
History of the HeLa Cell Line, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE: BODIES, ANXIETIES, ETHICS
53 (Paul E. Brodwin ed., 2000); REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS
(2010); CATHERINE WALDBY & ROBERT MITCHELL, TISSUE ECONOMIES: BLOOD, ORGANS, AND
CELL LINES IN LATE CAPITALISM (2006); Hannah Landecker, Between Beneficence and Chattel: The Human Biological in Law and Science, 12 SCI. IN CONTEXT 203 (1999).
24. Cedric M. Smith, Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere—Above All, Do No
Harm!, 45 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 371, 371 (2005).
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products in medicine was not only technically difficult, if not impossible, but also philosophically suspect. 25 Before the biomedical turn,
the appropriate treatment in each case depended on the patient as
much as the disease. Each body was considered an integrated whole,
highly individual in its reaction to the environment. Medical care
was designed to promote the restoration of the unique internal balance of each patient. Scientific medicine, informed by laboratory investigations, supported a new universal conception of the body, reducible to chemicals. The doctor’s role became to identify and treat
disease, which was considered curable in similar ways for all patients. 26 Only with this universal understanding of the human body
was it possible to imagine using parts of one person to treat another.
Since this conceptual shift, the category of body products has
steadily expanded. Blood, as one of the first body products, greatly
enhanced surgical success through its use in transfusions. Banked
blood enabled doctors to attempt daring new transplant operations,
promoting the creation and use of more types of body products. The
passage of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in 1984 reflected the growing success of organ transplants.27 Doctors performed
the first successful human kidney transplant in 1954 and then continued to attempt the replacement of more organs, including hearts,
lungs, and livers. 28
At the time of its passage, NOTA was the first federal law regulating the compensation offered to body product suppliers. In part,
NOTA and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (an earlier model law
regarding organ donation) were designed to replace existing common
law doctrines that raised doubt about the status of body products as
property-at-law. 29 These common-law doctrines predated the turn to
biomedicine. The legal status of a human corpse has long been a
vexed issue in Anglo-American law. The biomedical turn depended on
the knowledge and technical skills gained through decades of human
dissection, a practice that created a demand for corpses in both England and the United States, leading to unsavory grave-robbing. 30 In
25. HOLLY TUCKER, BLOOD WORK: A TALE OF MEDICINE AND MURDER IN THE
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 31-33, 124-26 (2011).
26. For this shift, see JOHN HARLEY WARNER, THE THERAPEUTIC PERSPECTIVE:
MEDICAL PRACTICE, KNOWLEDGE, AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA, 1820-1885 (1986).
27. Jed Adam Gross, Note, E Pluribus UNOS: The National Organ Transplant Act and
Its Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 145, 166-76 (2008).
28. See J. Englebert Dunphy, The Story of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
67, 67-72 (1969) (history and state of transplantation as of 1969); Gross, supra note 27, at
164, 166, 170 (further developments during 1970s).
29. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (first promulgated in 1968); Gross, supra note 27, at 156-57.
30. RUTH RICHARDSON, DEATH, DISSECTION AND THE DESTITUTE (1987) (human dissection in England); MICHAEL SAPPOL, A TRAFFIC OF DEAD BODIES: ANATOMY AND
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cases involving stealing corpses, mistreating corpses, and fights
about autopsies and who got to control where a body was buried,
courts considered whether there could be property interests in the
body, at least after death. 31
Such disputes had been governed at British common law by a rule
against finding any property interest in dead bodies. This rule, like
so much else in British common law, evolved after its migration to
the new United States. 32 American courts have been more receptive
to property claims, or at least “quasi-property” claims, in dead bodies.33 The case law of body property, however, remains scattered and
inconsistent. Several state supreme courts recognize quasi-property
interests in body products while other courts reject the existence of
any property interest in human bodies, living or dead, or materials
taken from them. 34 The clearest law regarding property in living bod-

EMBODIED SOCIAL IDENTITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002); Alan C. Braddock,

“Jeff College Boys”: Thomas Eakins, Dr. Forbes, and Anatomical Fraternity in Postbellum
Philadelphia, 57 AM. Q. 355, 361-62 (2005); Robert J. Swan, Prelude and Aftermath of the
Doctors’ Riot of 1788: A Religious Interpretation of White and Black Reaction to Grave
Robbing, 81 N.Y. HIST. 417, 424-25 (2000). There was also a link between dissection and
criminal law as hanged criminals were used for anatomical study. See Richard Ward, The
Criminal Corpse, Anatomists, and the Criminal Law: Parliamentary Attempts to Extend
the Dissection of Offenders in Late Eighteenth-Century England, 54 J. BRIT. STUD. 63, 6465 (2015); Steven Robert Wilf, Anatomy and Punishment in Late Eighteenth-Century New
York, 22 J. SOC. HIST. 507, 507 (1989).
31. See, e.g., GEORGE H. WEINMANN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BULLETIN OF THE

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL NO. 73: A SURVEY OF THE LAW CONCERNING DEAD HUMAN
BODIES 21-23 (1929); Walter F. Kuzenski, Property in Dead Bodies, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 1719 (1924); Allan D. Vestal et al., Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue Homotransplantation, 18
U. DET. L.J. 171, 173-181 (1955); see also Oliver Wendell Hall, Jr., Case Note, Property
Interest in a Dead Body, 2 ARK. L. REV. 124 (1947) (noting confusion in case decided by
Supreme Court of Arkansas, in which court found property rights in mutilated body but did
not specify whether the property rights stemmed from common law or statute).
32. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2002);
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991).
33. Newman, 287 F.3d at 792-93, 796-98 (citing cases in agreement from Indiana,
Rhode Island, and California and finding that California statute created property interests
for next of kin in decedent’s body); Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 480, 482 (citing cases in agreement from Utah, Louisiana, and Arkansas, but avoiding determination under Ohio law);
Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 1983) (identifying quasi-property rights in
corpse); HARDCASTLE, supra note 22, at 25-28, 40-46 (discussing British “no property” principle and contrary U.S. case law). But see Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989) (right to dispose of decedent’s body does not supersede coroner’s authority to
temporarily hold body); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434-35
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (describing quasi-property approach as discredited).
34. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (finding decedent had limited property interest in sperm); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (quasi-property interest in frozen embryos). But see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 496-97 (Cal. 1990) (no property interest in excised
spleen); cases cited supra note 33; see also Rao, supra note 12, at 383-87, 414-17 (compiling
cases); Render, supra note 14, at 556 (describing legal decisions as “awkward, unwieldy,
[and] incoherent”).
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ies in the new republic had been the law of slavery. 35 While that body
of law was swept away by the Thirteenth Amendment, its legacy
haunts any judicial decision regarding property in or from bodies.36
Despite the recurrence of body property claims in the courts, the
existing statutes regarding body products have largely sidestepped
such questions. Over a century after the introduction of these new
therapeutics, the law of body products remains remarkably sparse
and frustratingly inconsistent.37
Organs are the most comprehensively regulated body product,
with NOTA providing a statutory scheme for their collection and allocation that assumes and reinforces the gift/commodity dichotomy.
Congress moved quickly to outlaw compensation to organ donors after one nascent business designed to broker kidneys from living suppliers caught the public’s attention.38 NOTA prohibits providing “valuable consideration” for the transfer of an organ for transplant.39
Blood as a body product has been regulated since 1930 when New
York City passed a municipal ordinance regulating blood sales that
was designed to protect the health of sellers and recipients. The city
law required all blood sellers to be registered, to have regular medi35. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 211-40. The law of
slavery is also related to the biomedical turn in that slaves were sometimes used for medical experimentation, perhaps most notoriously by Dr. J. Marion Sims, the so-called “father
of gynecology.” DEBORAH KUHN MCGREGOR, SEXUAL SURGERY AND THE ORIGINS OF
GYNECOLOGY: J. MARION SIMS, HIS HOSPITAL, AND HIS PATIENTS 1, 42-52 (1989); Barron H.
Lerner, Scholars Argue over Legacy of Surgeon Who Was Lionized, Then Vilified, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/28/health/scholars-argue-over-legacy-ofsurgeon-who-was-lionized-then-vilified.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W6B5-KDDT]. There is
also a conceptual link between property in living bodies and laws criminalizing prostitution; bans on the sale of sexual services have also been called bans on self-propertization,
and human trafficking for sexual purposes is also viewed as a form of slavery. For an introduction to the debates and international literature, see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV.
271 (2011). For analysis of prostitution and commodification, see RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 131-36.
36. See sources cited supra note 1.
37. See HARDCASTLE, supra note 22, at 1; Render, supra note 14, at 554-56. Note that
the Internal Revenue Service and tax courts have also had to consider the status of body
products. For the inconsistent tax rulings on the issue, see Bridget J. Crawford, Our Bodies, Our (Tax) Selves, 31 VA. TAX REV. 695, 717-31 (2012); Lisa Milot, What Are We—

Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1072-79 (2010) (detailing both IRS actions and court
decisions related to taxation); see also Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51 (T.C. 2015) (determin-

ing that income received by egg donor was taxable).
38. Gross, supra note 27, at 178-80. NOTA also established the non-profit organ procurement and transplantation network to manage the supply and allocation of organs for
transplant. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).
39. § 274e(a). Reimbursement of expenses resulting from transfer, such as loss of work
due to hospitalization for a living kidney donation and the costs of medical care for the supplier, are not considered “valuable consideration.” § 274e(c)(2). The ban only applies to transfers
of organs “for use in human transplantation,” not to transfers for other purposes. § 274e(a).
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cal examinations, and to limit the frequency of bleedings. Suppliers
were issued booklets in which dates of each sale and medical examination were to be recorded. 40 The first state laws regarding blood,
however, were not aimed at regulating suppliers or at the safety of
the supply. In the 1960s and early 1970s, many states passed socalled blood shield laws protecting blood banks, doctors, and hospitals against strict product liability claims for transfusion-related injuries to patients. These laws declared disembodied blood used for
transfusion to be part of medical “services” and legally outside the
category of a “good.” 41 The effect of these laws was to deny disembodied blood the status of property-at-law, even when bought and sold.42
Blood and blood products (therapeutics made from whole blood)
are also regulated federally. These regulations, which are promulgated under the authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
regulate biologics, focus on safety by regulating the conditions of collection, storage, and transport. 43 The FDA also asserts such regulatory power over gametes, bone, and other tissues such as corneas, skin,
and tendons, but has not promulgated regulations as extensively for
these products.44
Beyond these federal laws and regulations and the state blood
shield laws, body products remain largely outside of any statutory
framework. Some states have expanded their blood shield laws in
40. N.Y. SANITARY CODE § 108 (adopted Nov. 21, 1930, and amended Mar. 14, 1939),

reprinted in FRITZ SCHIFF & WILLIAM C. BOYD, BLOOD GROUPING TECHNIC: A MANUAL FOR

CLINICIANS, SEROLOGISTS, ANTHROPOLOGISTS, AND STUDENTS OF LEGAL AND MILITARY
MEDICINE 115-16 (1942); see also Public Health Law of 1909 §24-a, as amended by L. 1930,
c. 326, and repealed by N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS SERV. PUB. HEALTH § 5002 (LexisNexis 1953).
41. California passed the first such law in 1955. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE § 1606 (West 1963) (original version at CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1623 (West
1955)). For later laws, see Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439, 474-75 n.203 (1972); Reuben A. Kessel, Transfused Blood,
Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J.L. & ECON. 265, 277 n.51 (1974); Recent
Cases, Torts—Strict Liability—Strict Liability in Tort Held Applicable in Suit by Patient
Against Hospital for Injuries Received from Transf[u]sion of Defective Blood, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 645, 649-50 n.26 (1971).
42. See infra Part V.
43. The FDA has been authorized to regulate blood and blood products as biologics since
the 1940s. 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2012). See discussion of statutory changes over time in Edward
L. Korwek, What Are Biologics? A Comparative Legislative, Regulatory and Scientific Analysis, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257, 270-72 (2007) (blood serum included in version first passed
in 1902; whole blood and blood plasma arguably included by amendment in 1947; blood
specifically added by amendment in 1970). For recent rules, see Blood Notices, Proposed
and Final Rules, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ActsRulesRegulations/BloodProposedFinalRules/
default.htm [https://perma.cc/YMK9-BJ6C] (last updated July 26, 2016).
44. FDA Regulation of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products
(HCT/P’s) Product List, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
TissueTissueProducts/RegulationofTissues/ucm150485.htm [https://perma.cc/AL3X-4EKT] (last
updated May 12, 2009); see also William C. Hudson, Note, Sperm Banking as a Strategy to
Reduce Harms Associated with Advancing Paternal Age, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 573, 579 (2015).
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recent decades to cover semen. 45 There are also laws in a few states
regulating the collection and/or exchange of human eggs and breast
milk as body products. 46 All body products, other than organs for
transplant as defined by NOTA, may be bought and sold, allowing
the current practices of sperm banks, egg brokers, and the Mother’s
Milk Cooperative. 47

B. Injustices in Body Product Creation, Allocation, and Use
The result of this patchwork is an unresolved debate in the courts
about the property status of body products, coupled with statutes
that assume the significance of the gift/commodity divide based on
supplier compensation without always banning such compensation.
Given that some body products are legally market-inalienable (e.g.,
organs), while others are usually gifted as a normative matter (e.g.,
blood), and still others are routinely bought from suppliers (e.g.,
gametes), the recurring debate in American law and policy is about
the allocation of body products among these categories. The central
question has been whether any body products should be exchangeable in markets or whether more body products should be regulated in
a NOTA-like way, with compensated transfer (sales) outlawed. The
discussion continues because there is increasing evidence that the
current system of organ procurement and allocation is unjust, leading to proposals to lift the ban on sales. At the same time, however,
the possibility of markets in human organs and the realities of organ
sales raise powerful moral repugnance in many, as well as fears of
45. Jennifer M. Vagle, Comment, Putting the “Product” in Reproduction: The Viability of a
Products Liability Action for Genetically Defective Sperm, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1175, 1219-21 (2011).
46. Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers’ Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 33-34 (2009)

(noting the lack of federal regulation and that a few states have asserted the authority to
regulate breast milk transfer); Kitty L. Cone, Note, Family Law—Egg Donation and Stem
Cell Research—Eggs for Sale: The Scrambled State of Legislation in the Human Egg Market,
35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 189, 217-26 (2012) (50 state survey of egg donation laws).
47. Egg donors recently settled a class action lawsuit against the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, in which they
alleged that a cap on supplier compensation was an unlawful anti-trust violation. Kamakahi
v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., 2012 WL 892163, No. C11-01781 SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14,
2012) (settlement reported by Jason Schlossler, Judge Approves Settlement in Egg Donor
Price-Fixing Suit: Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 24 NO. 6
WESTLAW J. ANTITRUST 2 (2016)). The Cooperative’s business model of supplier compensation
violated the norm established in milk banking for the last forty years. Janet Golden, From
Commodity to Gift: Gender, Class, and the Meaning of Breast Milk in the Twentieth Century,
59 THE HISTORIAN 75 (1996); see also NCBA CLUSA, Member News: Co-op Redefines Milk
Banking, First to Offer Donor Payment and Commercially Sterile Milk (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.ncba.coop/press-releases/355-member-news-co-op-redefines-milk-banking,-first-tooffer-donor-payment-and-commercially-sterile-milk [https://perma.cc/J9NK-SXGE]. Since
2013, one of the milk banks affiliated with the for-profit business, Prolacta Bioscience, has
also begun offering payment to its suppliers. TINY TREASURES MILK BANK,
http://tinytreasuresmilkbank.com/ [https://perma.cc/DHQ9-T2EQ].
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injustice. Drawing from the evidence about organ exchange and experience with other body products, scholars have identified three
broad, interlocking harms arising from body product regulation focused on supplier compensation: (a) scarcity of body products; (b) discrimination based on race and sex in terms of suppliers, recipients,
and compensation; and (c) gray and black markets in which suppliers
and recipients alike are vulnerable to the medical harms NOTA’s ban
on supplier compensation was designed to prevent. 48
Since 1984, the number of patients waiting for organ transplants
has risen faster than the number of organs available for transplant.49
This scarcity necessarily means that some patients die who might
have survived had they received a transplant in time. While there
are multiple contributing factors to this scarcity, many scholars have
argued that the inability to offer compensation for organs to benefit
the deceased’s heirs or living donors directly is one factor. 50
This scarcity forces difficult decisions in allocation, leading to discrimination. Data on organ transplants show that on average, racial
minorities are more likely to have their organs harvested and are less
likely to receive organs.51 For patients needing a bone marrow transplant, racial minorities and those of mixed racial heritage are much
less likely to find an immunocompatible match on the national donor
registry. This disparity drove the plaintiffs in Flynn v. Holder to seek
permission to offer supplier compensation, despite NOTA’s prohibition. They hoped to promote their offer of compensation within minority communities, motivating more donors and reducing the current racial disparity in access to bone marrow transplants. 52
The current regime also supports sex discrimination in supplier
compensation in ways that disadvantage women. Semen, sourced
solely from men, can legally be sold, and sperm banks currently pay
suppliers.53 Body products sourced solely from women, breast milk
and eggs, are treated differently. While they are legally saleable, they
48. See GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 14 (categorizing the harms as “shortage” and “bias”). This literature is vast. See sources cited supra note 12; see also, e.g., Symposium,
Organs and Inducements, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2014); Symposium, The Human
Body as Property? Possession, Control and Commodification, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 1 (2014);
Eugene Volokh, Essay, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1837-42 (2007).
49. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 7, 37-47; Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Primer
on Kidney Transplantation: Anatomy of the Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (2014).
50. Since organ sales are outlawed, there is no data directly supporting this claim.
But cf. Nicola Lacetera et al., Rewarding Altruism? A Natural Field Experiment 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17636, 2011) (payment for blood increases
willing suppliers), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17636 [https://perma.cc/M78M-F5CL].
51. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 5.
52. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
53. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete
Market, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61 (2009) [hereinafter Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans].
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are largely kept on the gift side of the gift/commodity divide in practice. Non-profit milk banks refuse to offer payment, telling women
their excess milk should be a maternal gift to needy babies. 54 While
egg suppliers are compensated, the construction of egg sales as gift
exchanges, in which generous women are compensated for inconvenience and risk—but not for their eggs—is used to limit women’s compensation; for example, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine long had a policy requiring members to cap payments to egg
suppliers but not to sperm suppliers.55
Finally, the legal requirement that organs be solely gifted, creating scarcity, has not only exacerbated racial injustices in the domestic allocation of organs, but has also stimulated the development of
black and grey markets as desperate patients travel to other countries to purchase the organs they need to live. 56 In these markets, the
absence of any regulation leaves both suppliers and recipients open
to abuse. Suppliers may be paid too little and permanently damage
their own health.57 Recipients may pay too much, not get what they
are paying for, and/or receive inadequate care. Gray and black markets also increase disparities based on socioeconomic class, which in
the United States generally follows race. The rich, for example, can
afford to travel abroad for a transplant or to bring an ostensibly uncompensated donor into the country for surgery, allowing them to
buy their way out of domestic organ allocation systems and further
exacerbating injustice in the allocation of body products. 58
The current legal regime, with its focus on supplier compensation
in order to separate gifts from commodities, is failing to provide an
adequate and justly allocated supply of many body products. The
failure of gift regimes, such as that used for kidneys, leads to calls for
commodification through markets (i.e., marketization). Marketization, as with gametes, leads to calls for compensation bans and/or
regulation. Neither gift regimes nor commodity regimes seem sufficient. The dichotomy drives unresolvable debates while injustices
54. Lois D.W. Arnold & Laraine Lockhart Borman, What are the Characteristics of
the Ideal Human Milk Donor?, 12 J. HUM. LACTATION 143, 143-44 (1996); Donor Human
Milk: Ensuring Safety and Ethical Allocation, HUM. MILK BANKING ASS’N OF N. AM.,

https://www.hmbana.org/sites/default/files/images/position-paper-safety-ethical.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RNW3-39B9].
55. ALMELING, supra note 13, at 44-45, 127-133; Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans, supra
note 53, at 60. Note that there is also racially discriminatory pricing of gametes.
ALMELING, supra note 13, at 69.
56. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 10-12; I. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and
Regulation of International Markets for Organs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 269, 280 (2013).
57. See generally Kate Greasley, A Legal Market in Organs: The Problem of Exploitation, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 51 (2012); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Commodity Fetishism in Organs Trafficking, 7 BODY & SOC’Y 31 (2001).
58. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 10-11; Cohen, supra note 56, at 280.
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continue. These debates seem unresolvable, in part because “[p]eople
harbor strong moral intuitions against buying and selling human
organs.” 59 This intuition is grounded in the standard narrative, a
way of understanding the gift/commodity dichotomy in terms of a
moral hierarchy.
III. THEORIZING BODY PROPERTY
Given these concerns, the law and policy of body product exchange
has drawn significant scholarly attention. With the moral intuitions
against buying and selling so naturalized, however, this scholarship,
while rich and fruitful in many ways, has also remained in part constrained by the gift/commodity dichotomy, operating either within it
or in opposition to it. Existing scholarship regarding body products
has drawn upon three broad theoretical critiques, each of which has
built upon and/or responded to the others. First, law and economics
scholars argued that markets are the most efficient mechanism for
preference satisfaction and that therefore there was no need for
mandatory gift exchange, even in areas traditionally considered removed from the market, such as parental relationships. In this view,
sometimes called “universal commodification,” all property should be
traded in markets. 60 Second, and in response, Margaret Radin distinguished propertization from marketization or commodification, drawing upon a Hegelian theory of personhood to postulate that the category of market-inalienability (gift) is crucially important to prevent
the inappropriate marketization of everything. 61 Third, scholars
working within what has been called commodification scholarship
have applied Radin’s marketization analysis and concept of “incomplete commodification” to multiple arenas. 62 While these scholars
prioritize human flourishing and personhood, they often draw on sociological deconstruction of the gift/commodity dichotomy to reject the
standard narrative and consider how market alienability, that is,
59. Stephen J. Choi et al., Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290, 292 (2014) (proposing intermediate transactions that
emphasize altruism rather than compensation).
60. While babies are not “body products,” the marketization of babies has been considered the high-water market of the law and economics approach to marketization. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323, 337-46 (1978). For the term “universal commodification,” see RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at xii-xiii, 2-6. Zelizer has called this approach
“nothing-but,” as there is nothing but the market. ZELIZER, PURCHASE OF INTIMACY, supra
note 13, at 78-81; see also Ertman, For Both Love and Money, supra note 13, at 1022-23.
61. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 54-78; Radin, MarketInalienability, supra note 15, at 1893-98, 1903-15; Radin, Property and Personhood, supra
note 14, at 958-59. Note that Radin developed her theory considering a range of what she
has called “contested commodities,” considering sex and children as well as body parts. See
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at title.
62. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 15, at 1917-18.
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sales, might generate desirable benefits.63 Roughly speaking, the first
two approaches work within the dichotomy, and the third in opposition to it.
This Part uses the intellectual history of property to develop a new
theoretical framework which is allied with the third approach as outside the gift/commodity dichotomy, and, like the second, is grounded
in property theory that emphasizes personhood over efficiency. To do
so, I first review the second and third approaches, emphasizing their
commonalities, and then link them to much older historical debates
about the functions of property in American law and society, as well
as to developments in property theory over the last two decades. This
intellectual history allows us to recognize body product exceptionalism within property law, policy, and scholarship as based on a historically contingent assumption that body products, as property, are
narrowly and exclusively market property. Having articulated this
assumption, we can then set body product exceptionalism aside in
favor of a broader view of property in preparation for building a law
of body products and markets that rests on new assumptions.

A. Propertization and Marketization
Writing only a few years after the passage of NOTA, Radin developed her influential theoretical justification for separating human
bodies from markets by considering body products as one type of potential market-inalienable property. 64 In doing so, she highlighted
the distinction between propertization and marketization. Markettransferability is a common, but not essential, feature of property.65
Radin justified market-inalienable property rights using her theory
of property as promoting human flourishing and personhood.66 In developing this personhood theory of property, she drew upon a Hegelian distinction between “things external by nature” and “substantive
constitutive elements of personality;” those items that must be alienable are in the former category, while those that must be inalienable

63. The most influential collection of commodification scholarship is RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 1.
64. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 15, at 1850-51, 1855-57; see also RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14.
65. For a discussion of “commodification” and “marketization” as “old” and “new”
terms for the process of making something market-alienable, see Ertman & Williams,
Preface, supra note 10, at 2. For an example of market-inalienable property outside of the
realm of human body products, see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63-64 (1979) (eagles legally killed and owned, but not lawfully saleable). I thank Greg Alexander for this example.
66. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 54; Radin, MarketInalienability, supra note 15, at 1851-52, 1903; Radin, Property and Personhood, supra
note 14, at 957-59 (summarizing personhood perspective on property); see also
Radin & Sunder, Introduction, supra note 1, at 10-12 (reflecting on Radin’s earlier work).
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are in the latter.67 This theory particularizes the inchoate moral repugnance with which many view sales of body products by locating
the harms threatened from such sale in the commodification of “constitutive elements of personality,” such that there is “reduction of the
person (subject) to a thing (object).” 68 Radin also identified the potential “domino effect” of talking about bodies in market terms that
might lead to a general belief that not only a body product, but also
the generosity with which it might be offered and the person who
supplied it, were for sale—harms inflicted not only upon individual
suppliers but on all humans, whose generosity and personhood were
thereby devalued through commensurability with money.69 Keeping
body products market-inalienable would prevent these harms, thus
preventing this type of property from undermining the general purpose of property to promote personhood and human flourishing.
Radin’s scholarship was informed by the contemporary congressional and medical debates about the desirability of people selling
one kidney and attempts to encourage the post-mortem gifting of
kidneys through organ donor registration programs. It was also a response to law and economics scholarship offering theoretical justifications for reliance on markets to allocate all resources. Responding to
a certain historical moment in legal scholarship, this theory provided
a firm grounding for the gift/commodity dichotomy and an argument
for recognizing body products as property-at-law while also keeping
them as market-inalienable property (i.e., an argument for NOTA).
Radin recognized that in our non-ideal world, restricting body
product sales (that is, mandatory gifting) might be harmful to human
flourishing, even as commodification was also harmful. This “double
bind” arises from the reality that bans on sale might impose harms
upon those with such limited resources that body product selling
might be better than other options. 70 Her theory thus did not resolve
the gift/commodity debate by unquestioning acceptance of the standard narrative of good gifts and harmful sales, nor attempt to justify
maintaining all body products as market-inalienable property in all
67. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 15, at 1893. Radin was careful to note
that personhood theory did not rely on a simplistic internal/external division, but should
consider “three main, overlapping aspects of personhood: freedom, identity, and contextuality” when identifying “personal things.” Id. at 1904-07. While Radin’s framing has been
very influential, it is not without its critics, some of whom have taken issue with her interpretation of Hegel. See, e.g., Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin’s Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55,
114-33 (1994); see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 57-69 (2012) (explaining Hegelian property theory).
68. Radin & Sunder, Introduction, supra note 1, at 8.
69. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 95-101; Radin, MarketInalienability, supra 15, at 1912-14; Radin & Sunder, Introduction, supra note 1, at 11.
70. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 15, at 1915-17; see also RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 123-24.

212

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:193

circumstances. Instead, it provided a justification for the marketinalienable category in the face of calls for universal commodification
and a means for analyzing when the law should mandate marketinalienability by weighing the possible harms of commodification
and the existence of the double bind with respect to each particular
body product.
As has been pointed out by subsequent scholars and further developed by Radin herself, this theoretical framework, insofar as it
applies to body products, rests on two assumptions. First, that the
domino effect is a real threat, because gifting and selling not only occur in separate mutually exclusive spheres, but also because there is
a tendency for the market sphere to overwhelm the non-market
sphere once a market is established.71 Second, that body products are
not “things external by nature” but “constitutive elements of personality,” such that their sale is always harmful as an objectification of
the human subject.72 In work that joins Radin’s project of recognizing
property and regulating its transfer in order to promote human flourishing and personhood, commodification scholars have examined
these assumptions in order to consider whether body products might
be market alienable in ways beneficial to the supplier, rather than
merely less harmful than mandatory gifting. 73 Testing the second assumption, they have asked whether there is always a double bind or
whether market alienability might occur while the supplier remained
the subject of commodification, creating property “external by nature” through disembodiment and actualizing its value without the
supplier becoming the object of commodification herself.74 Returning
to the first assumption, they have also questioned whether sales and
market rhetoric surrounding body products lead inexorably to troubling commodification of motivation and identity.
Just as Radin’s pioneering work developed within the intellectual
context of legal scholarship, subsequent scholars were informed by
Viviana Zelizer’s path-breaking work in sociology of markets that
began to reach a wider academic audience in the 1980s and 1990s.75
This work used historical examples to disrupt the idea of separate,
mutually exclusive, spheres of market relationships and intimate
relationships and provided a theoretical framework for opposing the
standard narrative and the gift/commodity dichotomy. More recent
71. See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at 46-53, 103 (explaining and rejecting spatial metaphor of market and non-market); Joan C. Williams & Viviana
A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is Not the Question, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 1, at 362.
72. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 15, at 1893.
73. This scholarship is collected in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 1.
74. Radin & Sunder, Introduction, supra note 1, at 11-12.
75. Ertman, For Both Love and Money, supra note 13.
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sociological studies concerning body product exchange in the late
twentieth- and early twenty-first-century United States have
demonstrated that cash exchanges and gift narratives coexist. Emotions such as altruism and attachment intermingle with exchange
value and compensation in ways both chosen by participants and
shaped by institutional narratives crafted to explain body product
transfer. 76 This scholarship provides evidence that the domino effect
is not inevitable, and that some body product sellers consider body
products as “things external to themselves,” the sale of which does
not threaten their personhood.
This work reveals that Radin’s initial move to examine “contested
commodities” as part of property theory rather than via the narrower
question of marketization is foundational. It is necessary to focus on
the question of whether and how body products are property
(propertization) rather than whether they should be saleable (marketization). Yet commodification scholarship has suggested that the
division between market-alienable and market-inalienable property,
while easy to enact in law, is not necessarily key to participants in
body product exchanges. That raises the significant question: how
then should we characterize body products as property?

B. Property and Body Products
Answering this question requires us to consider the intellectual
history of property theory, and in so doing, better understand the
theoretical origins of the gift/commodity dichotomy in legal scholarship. This history reveals property’s incoherencies and the multiple
purposes it is asked to serve in American law and political philosophy. It also reveals that a focus on propertization does not avoid the
question of markets. In his investigation of the “meaning of property,” Jedediah Purdy starts from the observation that all property is
“intimately tied to markets.” 77 The nature of those ties, like much
else about property, has long been contested. Purdy has argued that
property is necessarily incoherent and resists a grand unifying theory
because it serves two conflicting ends in political philosophy: to provide the basis of social order and to provide the basis of personal
freedom. 78 How these conflicting ends are understood, and at least
partially reconciled, has much to do with markets.
Because of the obvious ties between body products and the individual self, the arguments for separating body products from markets
tend to focus on the purpose of property to promote human freedom,
76. ALMELING, supra note 13 (gametes); HEALY, supra note 13 (blood and organs).
77. JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE
LEGAL IMAGINATION 4 (2010).
78. Id. at 9-11.
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what Purdy calls the “master value.” 79 If we follow Purdy in analyzing human freedom along three axes of “choice without interference,
a rich set of alternatives, and the subjective capacity to identify and
pursue interests and projects,” then recognizing property in human
bodies may implicate all three. 80 Having money on offer for body
products in a world in which a rich set of alternatives and the capacity to pursue interests and projects are unequally distributed means
that those who are already lacking in these aspects of freedom to act
will be unable to choose to sell their body products without interference. Their more urgent need for resources to access such alternatives and capacities interferes with their ability to make a free choice
about propertizing their bodies. From this perspective, if body products are property, sales of such property must be banned for such
property to advance (rather than to impede) personal freedom. Banning such sales while allowing gifting protects the disadvantaged
from acting in unfree ways. This argument is consonant with Radin’s
argument that body parts should be market-inalienable to preserve
personhood and human flourishing, and with her argument that such
market-inalienability may create a double bind.
If we take a different perspective on markets, however, we can use
property theory to explain the propertization of body products quite
differently, even while still focusing on the master value of personal
freedom. The ability to harvest body products from oneself for sale
can be grafted onto the classic liberal tradition of property as enhancing personal freedom by providing the ability to participate in markets. In this tradition, as developed in American law and politics during the nineteenth century through the concept of freedom of contract, the ability of every human to sell one’s labor is a cornerstone of
both industrial capitalism and individual freedom. Recognizing property in one’s hair, blood, or semen becomes simply another aspect of
this tradition. It provides all individuals with additional unconstrained choices of property to sell or give away, and thus enhances
their ability to access a rich set of alternatives and to pursue individual projects. While allowing someone else to take property from one’s
body would be to deny the exclusive right of ownership at the core of
both property theory and the liberal individual self, to grant property
rights to the supplying body does not. Freely alienable property in
the human body can thus be seen as constitutive of human freedom
in ways that promote human flourishing.
Thus far, this discussion of property and its purposes has proceeded based on the assumption that we are discussing what Purdy calls

79. Id. at 4.
80. Id. at 11.
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“liberal property.” 81 Classic liberal political theory assumes that
property is that which can be traded in markets. Trading property in
markets supports and reconciles the two oft-conflicting ends of property: social order and individual freedom. It provides the basis of personal freedom by allowing individuals to express their preferences
through the marketplace by property exchange, and provides the basis of social order by giving the state its purpose, made manifest
through law, to protect the freedom to exchange property. 82 Social
order is created and maintained to preserve individual freedom
through the institution of property. From this perspective, the question of whether body products should be recognized as property-atlaw leads immediately to the question of their free exchange in markets, the answer to which depends on which of the preceding two
narratives is more persuasive. The assumption that all property is
liberal property has led courts to deny property status to body products so as to avoid their free market exchange and has led legislatures (as a matter of policy) and Radin (as a matter of theory) to
place body products in a special category of property that is prohibited from market exchanges. 83 The gift-versus-commodity divide and
the domino effect assume liberal property.
There is more than one understanding of property within American political philosophy and law, however, and like the
gift/commodity dichotomy and the category of market-inalienability,
liberal property is not an unchanging, timeless concept. Gregory Alexander has traced the detailed intellectual history of property in
American law as not only theoretically riven by its conflicting duties
to serve social cohesion and individual freedom, but also as further
divided into two separate philosophical traditions that take different
approaches toward balancing those duties. 84 Rather than commodity
versus gift, Alexander has taught us about commodity versus propriety, or, in twenty-first-century terminology, ‘market property’ versus
‘civic property.’ 85 The commodity, or market, perspective considers
property to be that which is exchanged in markets. Market property
acts as a means of satisfying individual preferences, creating the ba81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 9-11.
83. I do not mean to suggest that Radin argues that all body products should be market-inalienable in all circumstances; she does not. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra
note 14, at 107, 126, 161.
84. In subsequent work, Alexander has sought to reconcile the conflicting ends of
property. See, e.g., Alexander, Property’s Ends, supra note 16, at 1260.
85. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 1. Alexander uses
“market” and “civic property” interchangeably with his preferred terms, “property-ascommodity” and “property as propriety.” Id. at 1-3, 384. Because the term ‘commodity’ is
already in use as part of body product scholarship, to avoid confusion I use ‘market property’ and ‘civic property’ rather than property-as-commodity and property as propriety.
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sis of social order through market exchanges. When Purdy discusses
“liberal property,” he is assuming market property. 86
In the second half of the twentieth century, the market property
conception came to dominate American legal thought as part of the
triumph of the market in the American liberal tradition, the same triumph that brought economic analysis to prominence within American
legal scholarship.87 Since 1970, contemporaneous with the development of the standard narrative and the gift/commodity dichotomy, as
well as the dominance of law and economics discourse, both legal
scholarship and court opinions “c[a]me to reflect the idea that the
basic, if not the sole, purpose of property is the satisfaction of individual preferences through market transactions.”88 The assumption of a
market property understanding became so broadly shared as to be
almost invisible. Body products, as they became considered propertyin-law during this period, were viewed through the lens of market
property, because all property was being viewed through this lens.
From a civic property perspective, however, the relationship between body products, markets, and property shifts. The civic property
perspective differs by prioritizing a normative vision of the public
good and considering property creation and exchange, both market
and non-market, as a means of advancing that vision, thereby promoting both individual freedom and social order. 89 The essence of civic property is its role linking private property and private interests to
the polity as a whole, reconciling the potential conflict between the
twin aims of human freedom and social order in a way that acknowledges, but does not prioritize, the market. Rather than beginning
with the market as the institution of human freedom, civic property
requires “some prior normative vision of how society and the polity
that governs it should be structured,” which defines the public good.90
This understanding of property was prevalent in the colonial era and

86. See generally PURDY, supra note 77.
87. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 379-83; RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 14, at xi (considering contested commodities within
the “modern market society”). From here forward, I will use Alexander’s term “market
property” rather than “liberal property.”
88. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 379.
89. Id. at 1-3, 6, 384-85; see also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 591-94 (1984) (describing early republic
origins of civic property and its persistence in American legal thought); Carol M. Rose, “Takings” and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as “Propriety,” in
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF
OWNERSHIP 49 (1994). Laura Underkuffler has described a similar division in the understanding of property between “broad” and “narrow” that mirrors Alexander’s historical argument. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 128-29 (1990).
90. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 2.
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the early republic but has waned since the eighteenth century as the
United States increased in population and diversity. 91
Alexander, however, has also noted that despite the dominance of
market property, the dialectic between civic and market conceptions
of property has continued throughout the twentieth century and into
the twenty-first, as has the attempt to reconcile community-oriented
purposes (the public good) and private preferences (possessive individualism) when considering the law and policy of property. 92 Most
American lawyers and policy makers accept that “there is no inherent contradiction between the institution of private property and a
regulated economy;” that is, that markets, and the ability to exchange property in markets, are in some ways subordinated to a conception of the public good enacted by legislatures and agencies.93
What is remarkable with respect to the law of body products, and so
much of the public debate surrounding their exchange, is that the
law and these debates not only assume market property, but also an
extremely narrow and rigid view of market property, as if there were
a contradiction between property in body products and regulated
markets. They assume that if body products are recognized as property, they will be market property traded solely to satisfy individual
preferences and that wealth-maximization will drive such exchanges,
leading to coercive and corruptive harms, such as those seen in unregulated black markets in organs.
Despite the prevalence of regulation of other commodities, when it
comes to body products there has been little room for thinking about
how the public good might be promoted through regulated markets.
Thus, the recent proposal to compensate bone marrow donors with a
flat fee of $3,000 in the form of scholarship money, housing subsidy,
or charitable donation encountered legal opposition as impermissible
under NOTA, and Mother’s Milk Cooperative’s offer of money for
breast milk provoked sharp criticism that the offer was too likely to
lead to nursing mothers depriving their own babies, despite the recognized shortage of breast milk for sick infants. 94 This assumption
that if regarded as property-in-law, body products must be not only
market property, but also market property traded in unregulated
markets, is a form of body product exceptionalism. This exceptionalism underlies the gift/commodity dichotomy, the standard narrative,
NOTA, and much of the debates about body product exchange. Like
the narrative itself, it needs to be disrupted.
91. Id. at 1-2, 4-5.
92. Id. at 384-85.
93. Id. at 361.
94. For the breast milk controversy, see Kozlowski, supra note 8; for bone marrow
proposal, see Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2012); Brief of Appellants at 8-9,
Flynn, 684 F.3d 852 (No. 10-55643).
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Recognizing this exceptionalism allows a rethinking of body products as property. We can replace the question of market alienable or
market inalienable, which has been circumscribed by this narrow
market vision of property, with the question of what purposes body
products as property should serve. Relinquishing body product exceptionalism allows consideration of the marketization of body products
not as the endpoint to be evaluated in terms of the threatened harms
of gifts versus the threatened harms of sales, but as a possible beneficial means toward achieving progressive goals. In the twenty-first
century, the long-standing civic property tradition is being reworked
in multiple ways by legal scholars, opening up theoretical and practical possibilities in balancing or reconciling the public and private
ends of property—possibilities that bear exploration when thinking
about regulating body products as property. 95
Parts IV and V provide groundwork for that exploration by identifying body product exceptionalism in theory and practice as a recent
historical construct that is not due to an inherent difference between
body products and other forms of property. The history of body products as property-in-action reveals that body products were first developed and used as a form of civic property. They were bought and
sold in service of a medically defined notion of the public good. Alexander used the writings of American legal thinkers to trace the civic
property tradition and its dialectical relationship with market property. 96 To analyze body products as property-in-action and complete
the denaturalization of the gift/commodity dichotomy, I examine the
words and actions of a different community, a community that was
not engaged in a discussion of what the law ought to be, or even what
sort of civil society the United States ought to foster, but rather in a
discussion of what it meant to be a medical professional.
IV. BODY PRODUCTS AS CIVIC PROPERTY-IN-ACTION
Doctors first created body products to treat patients. By analyzing
the actions and statements of medical professionals to understand
the early relationship between body products and markets, I am
working in the tradition of a law and society approach to legal history, considering law as it arises out of community practices as well as
analyzing statutes and judicial decisions. 97 I also draw upon a distinction often explored in law and society scholarship between law-inbooks and law-in-action. 98 Analyzing this history through the lens of
95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
96. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 15.
97. This form of legal history owes much to the pioneering work of J. Willard Hurst.
Christopher Tomlins, Engaging Willard Hurst: A Symposium, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. xiii (2000).
98. This distinction was analyzed by Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910), and further theorized in subsequent law and society scholarship.
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property theory reveals that as doctors acquired, stored, and sold the
first body products, human milk and blood, they were creating property-in-action. 99 Further, their perspective toward this new property
can best be described as a civic property view, although theirs was a
medicalized vision of civic property. The doctors had a clear normative vision underpinning the use of this new property. In the first
decades of using these body products, they relied on market exchanges to manage body products in the service of three interrelated goals:
(i) to generate adequate and safe supplies of body products for use in
medical treatment; (ii) to provide body products to all patients who
needed them, not just those who could afford to pay; and (iii) to provide compensation to suppliers sufficient to encourage repeat sales,
gain compliance with safety-related measures, and, in some instances, promote the health and well-being of the suppliers themselves. In
this civic property-in-action framework, in which market exchanges
were assumed to be in the service of these tripartite goals, the question of gift versus commodity simply did not arise.

A. Medical Professionalism and Markets
The medical vision of body products as civic property-in-action was
a result of both the medical profession’s self-conception and the dominant means of allocating and financing medical care at the turn of
the twentieth century. Doctors facing patients needing treatment
asked themselves intensely practical and urgent questions.100 How
were they going to get body products to use in treatment, who was
going to pay for them, and who would receive these new treatments?
These questions arose in a new context when the human body became the source of desired therapeutics, but they were informed by
long-standing tensions within the medical community, arising out of
doctors’ desire both to be recognized as professionals and to make a
living from practicing medicine.
Formally trained doctors labored throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries to establish the medical profession as the authoritative source of medical treatment. 101 As part of their understanding

See, e.g., David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology
of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157 (1984) (tracing Pound’s influence on sociological studies of law).
99. For previous uses of the concept of property-in-action, see generally, for example,
John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89
NEB. L. REV. 739 (2011); Sidney Post Simpson, Book Review, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1211, 1215
(1936) (reviewing C. REINOLD NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY (1936)).
100. More detailed discussion of the history described below can be found in SWANSON,
supra note 4, as well as in the historiography referenced infra in the notes to Part IV.
101. Formally trained doctors competed with a wide range of other practitioners in a
medical marketplace in which patients could, and did, seek multiple forms of care. While the
medical profession was significantly organized by the turn of the twentieth century, it was
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of their profession, doctors endorsed the idea that they were called to
serve those who needed their attention, in ways that a shoe manufacturer, for example, is not called by professional ethics to provide
shoes for the barefoot. Nor did doctors think of themselves as selling
their time like the laborer in the shoe factory. As professionals, doctors sold their expertise rather than products or labor. This ideal of
service and the primacy of expertise, cornerstones of the successful
move to professionalize medicine, have always been in tension with
the desire of many doctors to make a living by practicing medicine,
and hence, with the ways in which medical care is allocated
and compensated.102
The initial impetus for developing the first body products was
primarily patients, not profits. 103 In the early stages of using body
products, doctors were not thinking about managing markets or even
about creating a reliable source of supply. Faced with a patient needing medical care, doctors sought access to the body product they
thought might help in an ad hoc manner. Doctors arranged sources of
bottled human milk to save the lives of premature and sick infants,
and sought blood suppliers to aid their efforts to resuscitate patients
“sinking . . . into the grave” from blood loss.104 When possible, they
looked for unpaid volunteers among those close at hand, but doctors
had no qualms about turning to cash as an obvious inducement to
persuade a healthy person to give up a body fluid to another. Body

not until the mid-twentieth century that it reached significant power, prestige, and wealth.
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 7-8, 80-81 (1982).
102. STARR, supra note 101, at 235-36. Note, too, that there is a distinction between
“medical ethics,” the formal ideals of the profession, and “medical morality,” the actual
standards of conduct within the medical community. ROBERT BAKER, BEFORE BIOETHICS: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE BIOETHICS
REVOLUTION 4 (2013).
103. While not discounting the desire of doctors to get paid, I found no evidence in my
historical research that any of the pioneering doctors sought to, or did, earn a premium
from their innovations with blood or milk. Cf. Kara W. Swanson, The Doctor’s Dilemma:
Paternalisms in the Medicolegal History of Assisted Reproduction and Abortion, 43 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 312, 314 (2015) (early fears of profiteering in providing access to donor
semen). There was no question of asserting intellectual property in these new methods or
therapeutics and no attempts by doctors to create commercial entities. Kara W. Swanson,

Human Milk as Technology and Technologies of Human Milk: Medical Imaginings in the
Early Twentieth-Century United States, 37 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 20, 29-32 (2009) [hereinafter Swanson, Human Milk as Technology] (describing medical opposition to patented

method for preserving human milk). Doctors did choose in some instances to publish their
experiments and results in medical journals and via professional conferences. In an era
before fee schedules, this common means of communication in the field could enhance professional prestige and thus, secondarily, possibly increase patient demand and the ability
to charge higher fees.
104. JAMES BLUNDELL, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICY AS AT PRESENT
TAUGHT 349 (London, E. Cox,1834). The published reports by Blundell, an English doctor, of
his success using transfusion to treat postpartum hemorrhage stimulated renewed interest
in transfusion in the nineteenth-century United States. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 26.
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products would never have become established as therapeutics without willing sellers and doctors acting as brokers.
The doctors who first used body products treated them as property
of the suppliers; a good that could be purchased and allocated as the
purchaser saw fit. Body products were thus property-in-action from
their origins in medical treatment. Further, as property-in-action,
body products were also immediately commodities in that they were
exchanged for cash. They were not merely market property, however,
because they were not bought and sold in profit-maximizing individual transactions. When doctors acted as purchasers or brokers, they
did so while maintaining the professional ideal of offering expertise
as a service. They were not profit-maximizing manufacturers or
tradesmen producing a good.
In order to exercise their expertise, doctors wanted a safe and adequate supply of body products that they could use to treat any patient as necessary. The ideal of service, however, complicated this
aspect of their vision of body products as property. 105 What if a needy
patient could not afford the treatment? The professional dilemma
that had always existed when a patient could not afford to pay for
care became more acute when the needed therapeutic was under the
control of a third party, a healthy stranger. For over a century, many
American doctors had provided care to some patients for free; the
hospital was originally a site of charity care for the indigent. Doctors
might treat charity patients on some days and spend the remainder
of their time treating private patients.106 Some of the pioneering doctors strove to manage that conflict in the context of body products by
controlling the supply and allocating it in their discretion among the
medically needy, which included both patients who could afford to
pay and those who could not. By shifting ownership from suppliers to
the doctors, doctors could better ensure allocation based on need rather than solely on ability to pay. Propertization thus could advance
the second aspect of their vision of the public good to be served by
body product exchange, providing treatment to all who needed it.
Some of these doctors promoted an even more encompassing vision
of the public good. In addition to the ability to practice using the most
effective treatments and to provide care to all medically needy, they
105. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the medical profession was
overwhelmingly, although not completely, male. It was also largely white. ELLEN S.
MORE, RESTORING THE BALANCE: WOMEN PHYSICIANS AND THE PROFESSION OF
MEDICINE, 1850-1995 3-5 (1999). The homogeneity of the profession in terms of race,
class, and gender unquestionably influenced medical ethics and norms, as well the practices of body product exchange.
106. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
HOSPITAL SYSTEM 338-41 (John Hopkins Univ. Press 1995) (1987); Swanson, Human Milk
as Technology, supra note 103, at 24 (describing how Dr. Fritz Talbot, an early twentiethcentury pediatrician, treated both private and charity patients).
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also imagined that in creating this new supply chain, in which
healthy human bodies became the source of new treatments, they
might advance the public health by promoting the ability of suppliers
to care for themselves and their families and remain healthy. They
thus added a third aspect to their vision of body products as civic
property-in-action.
Although the purchase and sale of human milk and blood as body
products developed differently, in each case doctors relied upon what
became known as “professional donors”—people willing to sell their
body products regularly and repeatedly as a means of supporting
themselves and their families. With each body product, doctors then
strove to establish and manage paid body product exchanges in ways
that promoted their vision of the public good.

B. Selling Mothers’ Milk as a “Double Charity”
Human milk was the first body product collected systematically by
doctors in the first years of the twentieth century. Breast milk was
the safest form of nutrition for babies at a time before pasteurization
and mechanical refrigerators. In its embodied form, human milk had
long been the object of monetary exchanges through the service of
wet nursing. 107 Traditionally, paid American wet nurses were unmarried women, often immigrants, who were willing to wean and board
out their own child (at great risk to its life) in order to work as a livein servant whose duties included breastfeeding and basic infant
care. 108 As industrialization increased the options for women to earn
wages, fewer women found wet nursing appealing. 109 During these
same decades, doctors focused on infant nutrition as the best way of
reducing mortality among their tiniest patients. Although there were
multiple “artificial feeding” options, many doctors believed that
premature infants and sick infants survived best when fed human
milk. 110 These doctors began to consider breast milk in bottles superior to wet nursing.
Wet nurses were not only increasingly difficult to find at the turn
of the twentieth century, but they also had the failing that doctors
and parents could not monitor the quantity or quality of milk they
provided to a patient. Beginning in 1910, one energetic young Boston
doctor, Fritz Talbot, envisioned improving medical control over this
107. FILDES, supra note 3.
108. This description applies to free women. In the antebellum south, slave women
might serve as unpaid wet nurses. GOLDEN, supra note 3, at 25-27.
109. Id. at 136-40.
110. RIMA D. APPLE, MOTHERS AND MEDICINE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF INFANT FEEDING,
1890-1950 6-11 (1987); GOLDEN, supra note 3, at 134-36; SYDNEY A. HALPERN, AMERICAN
PEDIATRICS: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF PROFESSIONALISM, 1880-1980 46 (1988).
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form of infant nutrition by inducing lactating women to express their
milk, which could then be examined for quality, processed into bottles, and dispensed in known quantities to his patients. Early experiments in Boston, in which a nurse traveled from home to home in a
reverse milk route collecting each mother’s contribution and paying
her by the ounce, were successful in creating a supply of disembodied
breast milk that Talbot and his fellow pediatricians could allocate
amongst the sickest babies. Doctors in Boston and elsewhere expanded upon this initial effort by creating “mothers’ milk stations,” institutions that purchased milk from lactating women, combined the
milk into a uniform product, pasteurized it, and resold it in bottles to
patients. 111 Now a body product, human milk as a good replaced the
service of wet nursing.
Talbot had started with the goal of developing a safe and adequate
supply of this therapeutic for his patients that would be more reliable, efficient, and controllable than the wet nurse. He used money to
induce women to provide this product. Talbot and his colleagues
thought carefully about the way they bought and sold milk. The doctors who established these institutions in cities across the United
States did not see the markets they were creating as primarily satisfying the individual preferences of the market participants. Rather,
the flow of money and milk were a means of fulfilling a medical vision of the public good.
For example, Dr. Raymond Hoobler developed the first mothers’
milk station in New York City in 1913. He experimented to determine how little he could offer mothers to get a reliable supply of raw
milk, striving to create an inventory at the lowest per ounce cost possible. 112 When women came daily to the station to express milk on
site, it was not only more efficient than a reverse milk route, but the
station nurse could, and did, supervise the women in washing themselves and expressing the milk, which promoted the safety of the resulting body product. Hoobler’s goal in keeping his cash outlay as low
as possible while meeting demand and safety concerns, however, was
not to buy low and then to sell the finished product for as much as
the market would bear. Rather, his “sincere desire [was] to increase
the supply of human milk available for feeding the sick children in
the wards and dispensary of Bellevue Hospital,” many of whom were
receiving free care as charity cases. 113 By keeping supplier pay111. GOLDEN, supra note 3, at 184-89; Janet Golden, From Wet Nurse Directory to
Milk Bank: The Delivery of Human Milk in Boston, 1909-1927, 62 BULL. HIST. MED. 589
(1988); Swanson, Human Milk as Technology, supra note 103, at 26-27.
112. B. Raymond Hoobler, An Experiment in the Collection of Human Milk for Hospital
and Dispensary Uses, 31 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS 171, 172 (1914) [hereinafter Hoobler,
An Experiment].
113. Id. at 171.
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ments low, Hoobler could keep charges to patients low, increasing
the number of sick babies who could access this potentially
life-saving therapeutic.
Hoobler later moved to Detroit and operated a mothers’ milk station there through the 1920s. At the Detroit station, administrators
sought to meet expenses, but had no expectation of profits. Hoobler
used a sliding fee scale to charge for the bottled milk. Rates up to
thirty cents per ounce paid by the well-to-do financed free bottles for
impoverished families of sick infants. 114 Bottled milk was a commodity traded in markets, but it was created and traded to serve a particular medical vision that combined doctors prescribing milk in their
professional expertise with treating all who needed milk. By treating
disembodied breast milk as property-in-action that was owned and
controlled by the station, the doctors were able to promote both goals.
Further, milk station administrators saw an opportunity to enhance the lives of their suppliers and the suppliers’ children. The
selling women had recently been obstetrical patients themselves, and
were responsible for the health of their infant and often other children. While Hoobler had experimented with the lowest cost per ounce
that he could offer sellers in New York City, he recognized that he
needed to offer enough to motivate these women to travel to the station daily to sell milk and to choose to continue lactating rather than
weaning their newborn in order to seek wage labor outside their
homes. Because women who chose to sell milk continued to nurse
their own infants and to remain home to care for them, as well as any
other children they might have, Hoobler called his milk-buying
scheme a “double charity.” 115 While supplying his infant patients,
Hoobler was offering the selling mothers and their children not only
wealth, but also improved health outcomes.
The “double charity” model encompassed more than cash payments. The New York milk sellers also received free medical checkups for themselves and their babies and advice on nutrition and baby
care. While the medical check-ups helped maintain the safety of the
milk and ensured that the women were not stinting their own infants, such postpartum care and well-baby visits were benefits in an
era before health insurance that also greatly increased the chances
that those families would thrive. In Chicago, selling mothers also received cow’s milk as a nutritional supplement every time they expressed milk, which bolstered their health.116 When describing the
mothers’ milk station in Boston in the 1930s, Talbot explained that
114. B. Raymond Hoobler, Human Milk: Its Commercial Production and Distribution,
84 JAMA 165, 165 (1925).
115. Hoobler, An Experiment, supra note 112, at 172-73.
116. Saving Lives with Mothers’ Milk, 18 HYGEIA 424, 425-28 (1940).
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caring for the supplying mothers, their babies, and other members of
their families had become “one of the important branches of the
work.” 117 By 1943, when the American Academy of Pediatrics issued
formal guidelines for managing a mothers’ milk station, the guidelines stated: “Regular milk donors should receive compensation sufficient to insure good standards of living and relief from financial worry.” 118 Supplier compensation was medically recommended as a
means of benefiting, rather than exploiting, suppliers.
Through the mothers’ milk station, disembodied breast milk became property-in-action. The doctors who prescribed it, the women
who sold it, and families who bought it to feed to their babies assumed it to be property. It was a market commodity in that it had a
per-ounce value, but it was created and distributed by medical professionals to serve particular ends. In action, bottled breast milk was
not classic market property, but a form of civic property. Doctors
managed purchases and sales in order to control and allocate human
milk in their professional discretion. Through market exchanges,
they furthered their long-standing professional vision of using their
expertise to treat those who sought their help. Creating medical
therapeutics sourced from human bodies created opportunity for exploitation—for example, women neglecting their own nurslings by selling too much milk—but also created an opportunity to replace a system of wet nursing premised on neglect of the nurse’s child. In a nonideal world involving many women and children without access to adequate healthcare, doctors created this new property to serve their
“double charity” vision of the public good, using propertization and
markets to improve the health of the seller as well as the recipient.

C. Professional Blood Donors
During the same decades that pediatricians were establishing
mothers’ milk stations, other doctors were working to save lives by
blood transfusion. Physiologically, it was challenging to make human
blood into a disembodied body product. The technical difficulties led
doctors to create a different sort of institution: blood donor registries.
These doctors too used money to motivate sellers in order to create a
safe and adequate supply. The early blood sellers, however, were
more like traditional wet nurses than the new milk sellers. The registries created by doctors and hospitals were lists of people willing to
sell their blood on demand at a patient’s bedside, like the wet nurses
who would travel to the baby’s home. Relying on the prompt availa117. Fritz B. Talbot, Introduction to Cornelia H. Macpherson, Standards for Directories
for Mother’s Milk, 15 J. PEDIATRICS 461, 461 (1939).
118. Comm. on Mothers’ Milk, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Recommended Standards for
the Operation of Mothers’ Milk Bureaus, 23 J. PEDIATRICS 112, 113 (1943).
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bility of what became known as “professional donors,” doctors could
use their expertise to decide when to perform transfusions. The
blood, however, remained embodied until immediately before use and
was sold directly from supplier to patient, with patients required to
pay the fee. These first blood markets thus treated blood more as
market property-in-action than civic property-in-action. Without
medical ownership and control of the blood supply, doctors could not
manage its exchange to serve their professional ideal of providing
treatment without regard to ability to pay. This limitation drove
some doctors to reconceive the blood supply system in order to transform it from market property-in-action to civic property-in-action.
Before blood could become any form of property-in-action, doctors
needed to learn how to perform blood transfusion safely and effectively, a process that was much more complicated and dangerous than
feeding a baby milk from a bottle. Blood transfusion had been a medical dream since the early modern period, but several centuries of effort had not resulted in much success by the early twentieth century.119
Medical experimenters made rapid progress during the first two decades of the century, however. By the 1910s, blood transfusion, though
still uncommon, was becoming more routinely successful.120 The ability
to keep blood outside the body briefly without clotting made blood into
a body product, susceptible to being treated as property.
As transfusion became more safe and effective, doctors faced the
problem of developing an adequate supply of blood. The blood supply
problem was a problem of supplier recruitment, similar to the problem pediatricians had faced earlier when relying on hard-to-find wet
nurses. There was no tradition of providing blood comparable to wet
nursing, however, nor an obvious target population, like lactating
women, from which to recruit blood suppliers. Like the pediatricians
who set up mother’s milk stations, surgeons began with the assumption that cash was the best inducement. They were happy to take
family members as unpaid volunteers, if available, but if not, money
turned strangers into blood suppliers. A young surgeon in Baltimore
offered a recovering patient $100 to serve as his first blood supplier. 121 As with human milk, blood sales were not taboo, but rather an
unproblematic necessity.
The registry system, a technique that had also been used for wet
nurses, made supplier recruitment more efficient. The registered suppliers were screened for medical problems, such as malaria or syphilis, both of which could be transmitted via a transfusion. Once blood
119. LEDERER, supra note 4, at 34-39.
120. Id. at 41-48; SWANSON, supra note 4, at 29-30.
121. BERTRAM M. BERNHEIM, ADVENTURE IN BLOOD TRANSFUSION 8 (1942); LEDERER,
supra note 4, at 45-46, 80-81.

2016]

RETHINKING BODY PROPERTY

227

group matching became routine in the 1920s, the blood type of registered sellers was also recorded.122 The registered professional donors
offered advantages over ad hoc unpaid volunteers. There was no wait
to determine blood type and no need to rely on hastily given assurances of good health in a context where it could be awkward for a family
member to admit to a syphilis infection. Some hospitals, such as the
Mayo Clinic, maintained their own registry.123 Other hospitals outsourced the work of recruiting suppliers to for-profit registries.124
While the registry provided a safe and adequate supply, the market property version of blood as property-in-action posed an increasing problem as blood transfusion became common by the 1930s. Professional donors were convenient, but they were too expensive for
poorer patients.125 If a charity patient lacked a suitable volunteer,
and the treating hospital was unwilling to bear the expense of a professional donor, the patient could not receive blood and might die as a
result. 126 Pediatricians had used the milk station to make bottled
milk into a form of civic property owned and managed by doctors,
which they could allocate among patients in their discretion, balancing the fees charged. Because each blood sale was structured as an
individual financial transaction between supplier and patient, there
was no way to perform a similar balancing act in support of the goal
of providing this life-saving treatment to all who needed it.
Doctors who considered it their professional duty to provide medical care regardless of the ability of patients to pay did their best to
combat this problem. One solution was a registry of unpaid suppliers.
In some towns, civic organizations created such registries: lists of citizens prosperous enough to pay professional donors for themselves
but willing to donate occasionally for the indigent. 127 In large urban
public hospitals, where no patient could afford professional donor
fees and the blood supply problem was a daily crisis, doctors adopted
a different approach They created an institution that was like the
122. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 40-41.
123. Herbert Z. Giffin & Samuel F. Haines, A Review of a Group of Professional Donors, 81 JAMA 532, 532 (1923).
124. Philip Levine & Eugene M. Katzin, A Survey of Blood Transfusion in America, 110
JAMA 1243, 1245 (1938).
125. Thomas Hale Ham, Transfusion Therapy: A Review of Blood Groups, Transfusion

Accidents, Hemolytic Reactions, Stored Blood, Transfusion Methods, and Plasma and Serum Transfusions, 223 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 332 (1940); Reuben Ottenberg, Reminiscences of the History of Blood Transfusion, 4 J. MOUNT SINAI HOSP. N.Y. 264, 270 (1937).
126. L.W. Diggs & Alice Jean Keith, Problems in Blood Banking, 9 AM. J. CLINICAL
PATHOLOGY 591, 591 (1939); Levine & Katzin, supra note 124, at 1245.
127. Arthur John Collinson, The Legion of Blood Donors!, HYGEIA 236, 236-37 (1940);
William DeKleine, Red Cross Blood Transfusion Projects, 111 JAMA 2101 (1938); C.A.
Pons, The Blood Donor Registry as a Substitute for the Blood Bank, 9 AM. J. CLINICAL
PATHOLOGY 587, 589-90 (1939); J.C. Furnas, Blood from a Stranger, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, Aug. 20, 1938, at 8.

228

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:193

milk station in that it collected and maintained a body product inventory under medical control and enabled doctors to access the product
whenever they felt it was necessary, without having to search for
volunteers or inquire into the finances of their patient. This institution, which became known as the “blood bank,” allowed doctors to
treat disembodied blood as civic property-in-action, exchanged in service of a medical vision of the public good.

D. Body Product Banks
Both the term “blood bank” and the new civic conception of blood
as property-in-action were the innovations of Dr. Bernard Fantus, a
pathologist at Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. In 1937, he
adopted the metaphor of a financial bank to describe his blood supply
management system, which was designed to eliminate reliance on
professional blood donors and thus save the lives of poor patients who
could not afford to buy blood. 128 In reimagining the way blood and
money flowed from suppliers to recipients, Fantus expanded his vision of the good to be served by such exchanges from the initial focus
on a safe and adequate supply to a broader vision that also encompassed the medical ideal of providing care to all who needed it. While
neither Fantus nor his medical colleagues explained it in such terms,
the blood bank transformed blood from market property-in-action to
civic property-in-action.
In the depths of the Great Depression, Cook County Hospital,
funded by the county to provide care for the indigent, was suffering
extreme budgetary constraints. 129 At Cook County, as at other public
hospitals, some patients died for want of blood.130 Seeking to remedy
this situation, Fantus created an institution, formally known as the
Blood Preservation Laboratory,131 which would make disembodied
blood into property-in-action. Fantus replaced individual transactions between professional donors and patients with a communal system of blood as a shared resource under medical control. While his
plan depended on the use of stored blood rather than blood freshly
collected at the bedside, 132 his key innovation was conceptual, a
128. The Therapy of the Cook County Hospital, 109 JAMA 128, 128 (Bernard Fantus
ed., 1937); see also LEDERER, supra note 4, at 89; SWANSON, supra note 4, at 49-51, 56-59.
129. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 49.
130. Bernard Fantus, Cook County’s Blood Bank, 50 MOD. HOSP. 57, 57 (1938).
131. Id.; Karl A. Meyer, The History of the Cook County Hospital Blood Bank, 23 Q.
BULL. NW. U. MED. SCHOOL 318, 319-20 (1949); Elizabeth H. Schirmer, The County Blood
Bank, COUNTY INTERN 5 (1943).
132. While Fantus worked to test and improve technologies of storing blood, those
technologies had been developed over time by many previous researchers. SWANSON, supra
note 4, at 52-55. Work on preserving blood began before World War I and was used to provide blood for military use during that conflict. William H. Schneider, Blood Transfusion in
Peace and War, 1900-1918, 10 SOC. HIST. MED. 105, 117-18 (1997). In the peacetime Unit-
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method of accounting for pints received and pints used. To explain
the management of his new laboratory, Fantus borrowed a term associated with capitalism and markets, the “bank.” Doctors were to
treat the hospital’s blood inventory like flows of money in and out of a
financial bank. “Just as one cannot draw money from a bank unless
one has deposited some,” so too the Cook County blood bank “cannot
supply blood unless as much comes in as goes out.”133 The blood
“bank” treated pints of blood as abstract units of value, just as a financial bank transforms each dollar bill into an abstract concept existing as credits and debits, which link the physical material deposited with that withdrawn. Through the bank, the act of supplying
blood became the transfer of a fungible commodity in which the supplier was no longer giving or selling blood to a particular patient, but
simply providing a unit of value without knowing the identity of the
recipient. In this way, the blood bank increased the commodification
of blood. Like the pediatricians who created mothers’ milk stations,
however, Fantus was not interested in organizing a free market in a
body product or in making a profit. His vision of the new relationship
between blood and money was driven by his medicalized conception
of the public good in which all who needed blood could receive it.
Like a milk station, a blood “bank” could be stocked by purchasing
blood and then reselling it on a sliding fee scale.134 This approach was
not possible at Cook County Hospital, however. Because all the patients were indigent, there was no possibility of using the better-off to
subsidize the poor. But Fantus had an advantage over milk station
administrators. Unlike human milk, which could never be supplied by
ed States, the Mayo Clinic may have had the first standing inventory of stored blood for
emergency use. See J.S. Lundy, R.M. Tovell & E.B. Tuohy, Annual Report for 1935 of the
Section on Anesthesia: Including Data on Blood Transfusion, 11 PROC. STAFF MEETINGS
MAYO CLINIC 432 (1936) (copy in NHU-0677: Subject Files, Blood Bank Folder, Mayo Clinic
Historical Unit, Rochester, MN). One early center of research on blood preservation was
Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital in New York City, where the ongoing work by Dr. John
Scudder was aided by the efforts of graduate student Dr. Charles Drew in the 1930s. By
the time Drew published his dissertation on banked blood in 1938, he was a leading expert
on blood storage and blood banking. Charles Richard Drew, “Banked Blood”: A Study in
Blood Preservation (1938) (unpublished D.M.S. dissertation, Columbia University),
https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/BGBBJT.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF6G-FREQ]; see also
William H. Schneider, Blood Transfusion Between the Wars, 58 J. HIST. MED. 187, 192-93
(2003) (innovations that led to use of stored blood by mid-1930s). Drew’s early leadership in
the World War II national blood program and his willingness as an African American to
speak out against racial segregation of blood led to an oft-repeated mistaken belief that
Drew single-handedly created the blood bank. SPENCIE LOVE, ONE BLOOD: THE DEATH AND
RESURRECTION OF CHARLES R. DREW 197-99 (1996).
133. Bernard Fantus, “Therapy of the Cook County Hospital,” Bulletin C (May 1937): 1,
copy in Box 1 2002-199, Bernard Fantus Papers, University of Chicago Archives, Chicago,
Illinois and reprinted in revised form as The Therapy of the Cook County Hospital, supra
note 128, at 128.
134. Fantus suggested that private hospitals might use such a scheme to manage their
blood supplies. Fantus, supra note 130, at 58.
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recipient babies, almost everyone who needed blood could supply blood.
By separating the time of supply from the time of use, patients themselves could supply blood after recovery. Friends and family could supply blood more easily if the person supplying on behalf of a patient was
not required to have the same blood type as the patient. The poor
might lack cash, but they had blood. Fantus created an institution that
relied on the obligation of all who used blood to provide blood.
His new bank required physicians to get their patients who needed blood to recruit anyone available to give a unit of blood. There was
no need to search for a volunteer who matched the patient’s blood
type or who was available to come to the hospital at the time of transfusion. A pint of any blood type, given at any time, was deposited in
Fantus’ refrigerator and became a “credit.” Doctors at Cook County
could withdraw blood from the hospital supply as needed so long as
their withdrawals (their “debits”) did not exceed their credits. 135 The
blood bank administrators maintained accounts, striving to keep the
books balanced.
Fantus’ innovation was wildly successful. While most doctors preferred fresh blood to stored blood for transfusions, doctors around the
country had been disturbed by their inability to transfuse indigent
patients. They shared Fantus’ goal of allowing doctors, rather than
the market for professional donors, to determine which patients received blood. Once publicized in the medical literature, the “bank” as
a system of managing a blood inventory was rapidly adopted by hospitals around the country.136 Through the bank, doctors treated blood as
civic property-in-action, serving the end of transfusing patients regardless of their ability to pay. Blood banks at Cook County and elsewhere found that they still needed to buy some blood to maintain adequate stocks, but such sales were no longer supplier to patient; instead, the sales were supplier to bank, incorporated within the medical vision of ensuring blood was available for all who needed it.137
While the two goals of a safe and adequate supply and allocation
based on need drove doctors as they developed ways of exchanging
both blood and milk, the physiological differences between blood and
milk as body products led to differences in the treatment of suppliers.
As described above, doctors saw mothers selling milk as a vulnerable
population who needed medical attention and could benefit both from
compensation and from the other benefits milk stations offered. The
“double charity” model was stressed less in blood sales. As doctors
sought reliable suppliers of blood for transfusion, however, they did
consider the health of suppliers, both to protect the intended recipi135. Id. at 57.
136. LEDERER, supra note 4, at 55-58; SWANSON, supra note 4, at 60.
137. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 59.
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ents from diseased blood and to fulfill their professional obligation to
do no harm to suppliers. The donor registries provided regular suppliers with medical check-ups that were important not only in maintaining a safe supply, but also could serve to protect the health of
sellers. The registries also kept records of each bleeding, established
limits on how often their participants could sell blood, and how much
blood a standard sale should entail. 138 The medical press paid at least
lip service to the notion that “professional donors,” who were almost
universally male, were “m[e]n of business” who were putting bread
and butter on the family table, selling blood as an honorable way of
earning during the high unemployment of the Great Depression.139
The implication was that the blood line was better than the bread
line and that payment aided these men and their families.
With the advent of the “bank,” however, and the new emphasis on
the recipient population as the source of supply, this consideration of
blood sales as beneficial to the supplier faded. The typical supplier became either a replacement donor (a patient, or a patient’s friend or
family member), or a person who feared becoming a patient and purchased a blood assurance plan, in which donation of a pint allowed free
blood for a year.140 These suppliers received neither money nor free
medical care. The benefit to these suppliers was instead in the return
to health of the recipient, either themselves or a loved one, and their
blood itself was payment for medical treatment. Blood selling still occurred, but the valorization of the seller disappeared, replaced by an
emphasis on the responsibility of patients to repay blood “loans.”141
Ironically, the analogy between body products and money created
by the “bank,” while developed to promote blood as civic property-inaction, later came to encourage a market property view of body product exchange, as the term “bank” became applied to all body product
inventories. During the Cold War era, as body products (particularly
banked blood) became a more common part of medical care and became property-at-law, they became increasingly viewed as market
rather than civic property. In this changing environment, doctors,
patients, and suppliers began to focus for the first time on the significance of the gift/commodity dichotomy and to assume the associated
moral hierarchy of the standard narrative.

138. See supra text accompanying note 40 (New York City enforced these requirements
by municipal regulation.); see also SWANSON, supra note 4, at 46-47.
139. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 42-44. For the gendered aspects that distinguished the
treatment of milk-selling mothers from “men of business,” see Id. at 234-35.
140. Id. at 56-57, 108-09.
141. Id. at 113.
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V. ORIGINS OF THE GIFT/COMMODITY DICHOTOMY
The early history of body products demonstrates that doctors created and treated disembodied blood and milk, the first body products,
as civic property-in-action by using market exchanges to further a
medical vision of the public good. By 1984, however, as the passage of
NOTA evidences, the gift/commodity dichotomy and the standard
narrative had become underlying assumptions of law and policy discussions. These discussions focused on supplier payment as the key
question in managing body product supply and allocation. The turn
to a market property perspective on body products, the increasing
importance of the gift/commodity dichotomy, and the association of a
moral hierarchy with gifts and sales were interrelated changes arising out of a complex series of dynamics in American medicine, law,
and society during the early Cold War decades. To denaturalize these
assumptions, we need to identify the powerful factors that created
the dichotomy and its explanatory narrative and that have contributed to the strength and endurance of these assumptions. These factors
originated in the management of what had become the most ubiquitous body product by the end of World War II: blood. Surprisingly,
the shift in understanding blood as a body product was not driven by
concerns about supplier exploitation or the morality of asking people
to sell parts of themselves. Rather, the motivations included the opposition of the medical profession to single-payer healthcare, the developing doctrine of strict product liability, opposition to for-profit
blood banks, and a combination of entrenched racism and increasing
understanding of blood-borne disease. 142

A. Free v. Paid Blood
During the 1950s and 1960s, blood banks became ubiquitous in
American hospitals. At the same time, the “battle of the blood banks”
raged. 143 The fight was not about the paid blood supplier. Like Fantus,
doctors during this period had no moral or ethical objection to paying
blood suppliers, but rather to their inability to treat indigent patients.
This fight was thus about the obligation of recipients. Doctors and
blood bankers objected to “something for nothing” blood; the idea that
patients might not have to pay in money or in blood for a transfusion.
The battle was fought between blood banks, particularly free-standing
community blood banks often organized by county medical societies,
and the American National Red Cross, which had opened regional
blood collection centers after its success in recruiting blood donors for

142. For a more detailed discussion of this history, from which this synopsis draws, see

Id. at 84-158.

143. M.G. Evans, The Battle of the Blood Banks, 56 MED. ECON. 55 (Feb. 1949).
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the military during World War II. 144 Through this battle, the rhetoric
and practice of blood supply management began to change, beginning
the separation between gifted blood and sold blood.
The community blood banks and the Red Cross blood centers
shared the goal of collecting blood to supply inventory to hospital
banks. The blood bankers, organized into the American Association of
Blood Banks (AABB),145 emphasized the analogy between blood
“banks” and financial institutions and stressed the obligation of each
recipient to repay what they called blood “loans.” Every pint withdrawn required a pint deposited, and it was the “personal responsibility” of the patient-debtor to make that deposit. Patients unable to
provide the blood themselves were encouraged to solicit friends and
family to give to their account, and pay down their debt. Extra encouragement was provided in the form of “replacement fees,” per-pint
charges that the bank would forgive once sufficient payment in kind
was received. 146 The system was designed to maintain inventory. If
the patient did not or could not repay in kind, the collected fees could
be used by the bank to buy blood from a paid supplier. 147
The Red Cross rejected Fantus’ banking metaphor and offered a
different model of blood supply management. It collected blood solely
from unpaid suppliers and provided it to hospitals with the promise
that patients would not be charged. 148 Rather than considering each
patient a debtor, the Red Cross promised “free blood” to all who
needed it. Members of the general public were the suppliers, solicited
not as debtors but as civic-minded altruistic donors. 149 To the medical
profession, which had been engaged in the buying and selling of body
products for decades, the Red Cross promise of “free blood” without
any obligation of recipient repayment was a dangerous severing of
the relationship between body products and markets that posed a
threat far beyond that of blood bank inventory shortages.150
144. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 86, 88-90, 108.
145. Founded in 1947, the Association formally changed its name in 2005 to “AABB.”
AABB Name Change, AABB HOME, http://www.aabb.org/about/who/Pages/namechange.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RJ8P-JKVK].
146. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 97, 107-09. Note that balancing the blood accounts was
made more complicated because some deposited pints had to be discarded due to contamination or age. To keep inventory up, many blood banks asked patients to repay loans at the
rate of 3 or even 4 replacement pints for each pint withdrawn. Id. at 118-19.
147. Id. at 108. Community and hospital blood banks could also turn to for-profit commercial blood banks, the successors to the for-profit donor registries, to buy blood. These
banks routinely paid all their suppliers. Id. at 131.
148. Id. at 91-92.
149. Id. at 91-93. During some periods, Red Cross centers and for-profit banks accepted
blood from replacement donors as well, transferring a credit to pay off a patient’s debt to a
hospital or community blood bank. Id. at 118-19.
150. Id. at 87, 94.
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The perceived danger in removing the responsibility of the recipient to pay for blood, a system of so-called “paid blood,” and replacing
it with “free blood” for all, regardless of ability to pay, was in the similarity between this approach and a single-payer model of delivering
health care. Government-funded health care provided without regard
to ability to pay was another way of managing the long-standing tension between the professional ethic of providing care for all and the
need to make a living as doctors. The traditional medical solution
had been individual doctors dividing their time and resources as they
saw fit between private paying patients and charity patients. Since
the early twentieth century, the American Medical Association
(AMA) had formally preferred this solution as more protective of
medical autonomy and profits than government-funded healthcare.
With the beginning of the sharp rise in healthcare costs in the postwar decades, stimulated by more effective and more expensive hospital-based care, the traditional solution was under threat because
fewer patients could afford the costs of hospitalization. America’s
wartime allies, like Great Britain, bolstered national health plans,
and in the 1960s, over the opposition of the AMA, the United States
passed Medicare and Medicaid, ushering in a new era in healthcare
financing for some sectors of the population. 151
During these decades, the relationship between disembodied blood
and the market became a proxy for these larger policy disputes.
Fighting this battle, blood bankers and organized medicine embraced
the banking metaphor with increasing fervor, insisting that “paid
blood” was superior to free blood, as they focused on the exchange
between patient and bank as the crucial characteristic of body product management. Free blood or paid blood was not simply a question
about how to acquire and manage blood, but also a struggle between
American democracy (assumed to be premised on liberal capitalism)
and socialism/communism. One attendee at the founding meeting of
the AABB warned his local medical society that “American free enterprise” was at risk if the “fundamental responsibility for replacement of blood bank loans” was not assumed by the borrower, that is,
the patient.152 The next step after “free blood” would be a “police
state” and “ultimately . . . a form of existence by directive.”153
Fighting this battle in the context of Cold War anti-communism and
rising health care costs, blood bankers hardened Fantus’ banking
metaphor, emphasizing that banked blood was a “personal resource”
rather than a communal one, shifting to a more market property
151. STARR, supra note 101, at 235-37, 280; SWANSON supra note 4, at 94-99.
152. Julius Winston Davenport, Jr., Blood Bank Administration, in PROCEEDINGS OF
BLOOD BANK INSTITUTE 121, 124, 126 (1947).
153. Julius W. Davenport Jr., Blood Transfusion in Louisiana: A Problem in Adequate
Medical Care, 102 NEW ORLEANS MED. & SURGICAL J. 259, 259, 263 (1949).
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viewpoint in which individual preference satisfaction appeared to be
the dominant goal. 154 Focusing on “individual responsibility,” transaction by transaction, the medical profession lost touch, at least rhetorically, with the intended civic property aspects of the banking
metaphor. Through their focus on the obligation of patients to pay for
blood, the “bank” became instead a powerful means of explaining
blood as private market property, like money in the bank.

B. Product Liability and Blood Banking
The opposition between “free” and “paid” blood of the blood bank
battles, while focused on exchange of a body product for value, differed from the contemporary gift/commodity dichotomy and had a
different accompanying narrative. In this earlier narrative, it was
recipient payment that was responsible, American, and virtuous,
whereas receiving blood as a free gift was shiftless, communistic, and
morally suspect. A further shift to the contemporary dichotomy occurred as banked blood as property-in-action became increasingly
also considered as property-at-law.
Before the blood “bank,” there had been lawsuits claiming harm
from blood transfusions. 155 But in ways unforeseen by Fantus, the
enthusiastic medical embrace of the bank metaphor, and particularly
the focus on recipient payment, caused lawyers and judges to think
about the legal framework governing blood transfusion in new ways.
To their horror, doctors and blood bankers found their actions in collecting, preparing, and using blood judged under product liability
law. The legal system, accustomed to regulating businesses, consumers, and commerce, considered property exchanged in markets as
market property, leaving no room for a civic property perspective.
Product liability law, a tort doctrine developed by courts at midcentury, emerged out of cases in which consumers were injured
through use of an unsafe product but could not prove any negligence.
Faced with a choice of innocent individuals bearing the costs of their
injuries or imposing the obligation of compensation on manufacturers, courts developed a theory that all products came with an implied
warranty of fitness for their intended purpose, which, if breached,
entitled the injured consumer to compensation from the manufacturer. 156 In 1953, counsel for Mrs. Perlmutter, a New York woman who
had allegedly contracted hepatitis from a blood transfusion, argued
154. American Association of Blood Banks, Blood: A Personal Resource, A Position
Paper (Sept. 20, 1976), copy included in BERNICE HEMPHILL, THE MOTHER OF BLOOD

BANKING: IRWIN MEMORIAL BLOOD BANK AND THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, 1944-1994, interviewed by Germaine LaBerge 431 (1998).
155. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 123 (describing lawsuits in 1920s and 1930s).
156. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 168-71 (2003).
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that this doctrine should apply in her case. Perlmutter’s attorney
convinced a state court that her payment of $60 for the infectious
pint of blood constituted a sale of a defective product and that the
hospital was liable for all her resulting harm without any proof of
negligence. 157 Even though the New York appellate court later overturned the ruling in a 4-3 decision, both the lower court decision and
the three-judge dissent disturbed doctors and blood bankers. 158
Neither the judges nor the medical professionals had any difficulty
with the status of disembodied blood as property. In its decision, the
appellate court readily agreed that this body product was propertyat-law, a conclusion that affirmed medical treatment of blood as
property-in-action. 159 Nor were the parties or the court concerned
about whether the blood had been bought from or donated by its supplier. The legal issue in 1953 was the interpretation of the bill sent to
the patient, representing the insistence of the supplying blood bank
that all blood should be “paid blood.”
The four-judge appellate majority agreed that banked blood was
property that had been sold by the bank and purchased by the patient. But the judges nevertheless refused to designate the transaction as a sale of a good:
Concepts of purchase and sale cannot separately be attached to the
healing materials—such as medicines, drugs or, indeed, blood—
supplied by the hospital for a price as part of the medical services
it offers. That the property or title to certain items of medical material may be transferred, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient during the course of medical treatment does not serve to
make each such transaction a sale. 160

Organized medicine agreed with the outcome, if not all aspects of
the reasoning. Doctors and blood bankers considered themselves
medical professionals providing health care services to patients, not
manufacturers. Yet they also considered the transfer of blood as
property-in-action as tantamount to a sale of a product. Medical professionals were convinced that the invisible hand of the market was
the best motivation to keep Americans participating in the blood
supply chain at the levels necessary to have adequate amounts, as
well as a bulwark against socialized medicine. As one blood bank
supporter reiterated in 1955: “[T]he hospital or community blood
bank is based on the philosophy that blood is a biological product,
157. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 128 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953), aff’d

without opinion, 129 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).

158. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 798 (N.Y. 1954); SWANSON supra
note 4, at 129.
159. Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
160. Id.
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like penicillin or any other commodity, and as such should be handled on economic principles.” 161 Blood banks, hospitals, and doctors
wanted to be free to sell or give away body products, as products;
however, they also understood these products as civic property-inaction, which they could use in their professional discretion without
implicating the law of sales premised on market property-at-law.
Although the hospital blood bank ultimately convinced the New
York court in Perlmutter that banked blood was a service rather than
a good, legal threats continued in subsequent lawsuits and in the developing legal literature.162 Despite the eventual outcome in Perlmutter, the AMA advised rethinking the relationship between blood,
cash, and markets, at least when billing patients. “Instead of making
a charge for blood, the hospital should make an equivalent and specific charge for the use of its facilities [i.e., the hospital blood bank]
and services of its [blood bank] technicians.” 163 The medical profession also sought legislative changes and succeeded in getting what
became known as “blood shield” laws passed in most states, which
declared that banked blood was not legally a product. 164 If considering blood as property-at-law meant it was market property, better
that it not be property at all, at least legally. These changes in law
and practice assisted the shift in focus away from recipient repayment, a focus that eventually moved toward supplier compensation in
the gift/commodity dichotomy.

C. For-Profit Blood Banking
The transition in focus from recipients to suppliers was apparent
in the arguments made by physicians, hospitals, and the administrators of a non-profit community blood bank in Kansas City in the
1960s during a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation. In
response to a complaint brought by two for-profit blood banks alleging that the refusal of local hospitals to do business with them was
an illegal restraint of trade, the FTC agreed that blood banking was
part of interstate commerce and that such a boycott was illegal under
federal trade laws.165 The legal battle raged until 1969, when a federal appellate court finally overturned the FTC decision. 166 Through the
161. Donald E. Brown, Basic Problem in Blood Banks: Free or Pay, 84 MOD. HOSP. 51,
55 (1955) (emphasis added).
162. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 130 (citing cases and law review articles).
163. Blood Transfusions—Medicolegal Responsibilities, 163 JAMA 283, 286 (1957).
164. Franklin, supra note 41, at 474-75 n.203 (laws passed in 41 states between 1955
and 1971); Kessel, supra note 41, at 277 n.51 (laws passed in Illinois and Florida).
165. In re Cmty. Blood Bank of the Kan. City Area, Inc., 70 F.T.C. 728 (1966) (providing the facts and history of the dispute, as well as the FTC ruling).
166. Cmty. Blood Bank of the Kan. City Area, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 405 F.2d
1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 1969).
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lens of the standard narrative, this dispute was a successful campaign by the medical profession to choose safe, donated blood from
the non-profit community blood bank rather than unsafe, bought
blood from for-profit blood banks in order to protect patients. Reexamined through the lens of property theory, however, the controversy is revealed as a fight between two conceptions of property. The
FTC assumed a narrow, market property understanding when it investigated blood as property-in-action in Kansas City. In their inveigling against “bought blood,” the new pejorative that would come to
replace “free blood” in the medical lexicon, the local doctors asserted
a civic property view of blood against the profit-maximization of the
for-profit banks. In their arguments, they revealed that their medical
ideals of professionalism and service remained, despite the heated
rhetoric of the blood battles.
The Kansas City dispute developed because the local medical society delayed opening a non-profit community blood bank due to internal
disputes.167 The hospital blood banks needed help maintaining inventory, and two for-profit blood banks opened to supply that need. Demand created an opportunity to make profits buying and reselling
blood. The for-profit banks relied almost exclusively on payments to
impoverished locals to acquire blood and were supervised by directors
whose experience and knowledge of blood management techniques
were minimal. Once the non-profit community blood bank opened, the
doctors who practiced at the Kansas City hospitals greatly preferred
blood provided from an organization they themselves controlled. The
local doctors therefore agreed that no hospital would accept blood
from the for-profit banks and that the hospital blood banks would not
consider a donation at such banks as repayment of a blood loan. 168
During the course of the litigation, the boycotting doctors justified
their actions in multiple ways. They pointed to the dubious credentials of the for-profit bank administrators and argued that blood from
those banks posed a health risk. Some argued that “paying [donors]
for blood [was] morally wrong.” 169 And they repeatedly asserted the
position that had ultimately triumphed in Perlmutter: banking blood
and providing blood to patients for transfusion was a service, not
trade in goods, and therefore the FTC had no jurisdiction. 170 This last
argument, used to translate medical civic property-in-action into legal non-property, obscured a fundamental aspect of the Kansas City

167. In re Cmty. Blood Bank, 70 F.T.C. at 915.
168. Id. at 739.
169. Id. at 819.
170. The banks eventually won on jurisdictional grounds, although not based on the
good/services distinction. The Court of Appeals found that the FTC did not have jurisdiction over non-profit entities. Cmty. Blood Bank, 405 F.2d at 1022.
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dispute.171 Whether banked blood was a good or service did not distinguish the for-profit banks the doctors opposed from the non-profit
bank they supported. The for-profit banks and non-profit bank each
supplied the hospital blood banks that ultimately responded to a doctor’s orders and provided blood for transfusion as part of medical
treatment. Nor, despite the testimony of some doctors, were the two
sides in fact arguing about whether professional donors were moral
or safe, because all the banks relied on paid suppliers. The non-profit
bank favored by the doctors bought 17-40% of its blood during the
period of the dispute and conducted blood drives in a state prison,
recruiting suppliers that were equivalent in socioeconomic status to
the impoverished blood sellers supplying the for-profit banks.172
While the objections to the lack of qualifications of the bank administrators were valid, elsewhere the blood bank community was addressing such concerns not by boycotts, but rather by creating its own
certification standards to assure banks of the quality of blood received from other banks.173
Although the parties did not articulate the dispute in these terms,
the most significant difference between the for-profit banks and the
non-profit bank was in the treatment of blood as property-in-action.
The goal of the for-profit bank administrators was to make a profit by
selling blood for more than they paid for it. They treated blood as
market property, a commodity traded in markets for individual
wealth maximization. Following the legal assumption that all property was market property, the FTC readily accepted their claims. The
non-profit banks’ refusal to deal was an illegal constraint on what
was otherwise understood as a free market, an action that impermissibly deprived the for-profit banks of their profits, in violation of regulations designed to increase competition and keep prices low.
The non-profit community bank also understood blood as propertyin-action but conceived of that property very differently. Its goal was
to maintain a stock so that it could provide the blood needed by the
local hospitals; ultimately, the local medical society that founded it
wanted safe, typed blood available whenever a doctor chose to order it
for any patient. It had been designed to serve the medical vision of
blood as civic property. The difference between blood as market property and civic property drove the distaste of doctors for the for-profit
171. This position was formally adopted by the AABB in 1962. American Association of
Blood Banks, Statement of Principles of Blood Procurement (Oct. 30, 1962), copy included
in Addendum to Memorandum to Assembly Members on the Committee on Public Health,
California State Legislature, dated March 25, 1966, California State Archives, A/C Public
Health, AB 333, 1963.
172. In re Cmty. Blood Bank, 70 F.T.C. at 765, 876.
173. E.R. Jennings, Standards, Inspection, Accreditation Programs of American Association
of Blood Banks, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON BLOOD AND BLOOD BANKING 109-11 (1964).
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banks and contributed to the operational differences they found objectionable. It was not the buying and selling of blood that disturbed
them, but rather buying low and selling high, at whatever price the
market would bear, without any thought of a “double charity” or of
fair allocation of resources between rich and poor. Doctors in Kansas
City and elsewhere had tolerated market property institutions as part
of the blood supply chain when necessary and as part of a system of
generating an inventory that they could control as civic property-inaction. Since the first for-profit blood registries, doctors had condoned
some profit-making by middlemen, as well as by the suppliers themselves. With the primary goal always remaining an adequate supply,
when doctors and hospital blood banks needed to rely on for-profit
banks, they did so. The New York City blood supply, for example, was
notoriously reliant on for-profit banks. 174 When there was an alternative, however, doctors and hospitals chose to work with institutions
aligned with their medical vision for blood as a body product. The
opening of the community blood bank in Kansas City provided that
alternative, and the doctors shifted their demand accordingly.
During the blood bank battles, when the enemy was what the
AMA called “socialized medicine,” the medical profession had elided
the distinction between modes of propertization. Blood bankers had
focused on the market nature of body products in order to emphasize
the commitment to free market capitalism in healthcare. The FTC
action, like the Perlmutter case, revealed the legal costs of the medical embrace of free market ideology. While doctors opposed “free
blood,” they also were uncomfortable with the free hand of the market displacing their expertise in allocating medical care.
In response to these legal challenges, the medical profession began
to turn away from any exchange of blood for cash. In addition to following the AMA recommendation to change billing practices to avoid
the appearance of selling a product to patients, blood banks also began to rethink the payment of suppliers. Blood sales by suppliers
were a classic market exchange of property, and invited application
of commercial law principles. Further, they were a foundational aspect of the for-profit business model that made non-profit banks and
doctors so uncomfortable in Kansas City. As part of an effort to avoid
the construction of blood as market property by a legal system that
largely recognized only one perspective on property and to distinguish preferred non-profit banks from for-profit banks, the professional donor, long a mainstay of the American blood supply, became
newly suspect as a participant in a cash-for-blood exchange. This
suspicion, and the focus on supplier payment as the crux of the
174. Cash Blood Banks Thriving in City, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1968; see also SWANSON,
supra note 4, at 106.
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gift/commodity dichotomy, was further fueled by fears of hepatitis
and entrenched racism.

D. Racism, Disease, and Gifting Blood
As per-pint patient charges disappeared, the transaction between
supplier and collecting institution remained the most visible part of
the blood system to most Americans. The less visible reality was that
all banked blood, regardless of its source, remained commodified property-in-action. Raw blood was processed into a fungible body product,
which could be billed out to patients as “services,” traded between
banks, or even sold to for-profit companies that used whole blood to
make other blood products. 175 Its origins in an unpaid donation at a
Red Cross center did not keep blood from being treated as a commodity; blood sourced from voluntary donors, as well as from replacement
donors and paid donors, became a commodity. As suppliers, however,
Americans experienced the difference between giving in their workplace at a blood drive, or at the hospital for a relative’s account, and
selling their blood at a storefront location in a poor part of town.
The professional donor had experienced downward mobility with
the increasing emphasis on replacement donors. While doctors were
uncomfortable with the market property vision of for-profit banks
that recruited the majority of paid blood sellers and with the legal
implications of cash exchanges, the lay public’s opposition had different origins. Americans increasingly saw the paid seller not as the
professional “man of business” he had been during the 1930s, but as
dirty, desperate, potentially diseased, and often a member of a racial
minority. This perception sometimes, but not always, matched reality. Blood sellers in the postwar decades included impecunious college
students, the temporarily unemployed, and in rural areas of Minnesota within driving distance of the Mayo Clinic, church groups seeking to earn money for their religious communities. They also included
skid row derelicts, especially in cities, and increasingly, it was these
sellers who were discussed in negative tones in the popular press.176
Patients had two mutually reinforcing reasons to shun the paid supplier: sociocultural anxiety about race and class, and a rising concern
about transfusion-acquired hepatitis.
The adoption of the banking metaphor, with its assumption that
all blood was equivalent, had never been strong enough to eliminate
deep-rooted cultural beliefs pre-dating blood transfusion and blood
banking that all blood was not the same. Blood, as the carrier of personal characteristics and family traits, was long believed to transfer
175. DOUGLAS STARR, BLOOD: AN EPIC HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND COMMERCE 250-52,
260-65 (1998) [hereinafter STARR, BLOOD].
176. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 143-44, 146-49.
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such qualities to a vulnerable patient, just as a baby shared the blood
of his or her family.177 In this understanding of blood, receiving a
transfusion from a social inferior was a threat. Fantus and many of
the first blood bankers had segregated blood by race, assuming that
white patients would object to blood from non-white donors, and this
segregation had persisted throughout the World War II national
blood program. 178
While fear of racial contamination through blood transfusion was
considered unscientific by the 1960s, lingering prejudice against
blood from racial others became reformulated into fear of “bad blood”
from those who sold it, supporting what would become a standard
narrative that donated, unpaid blood was superior. 179 While fears of
blood-borne diseases were justified, discriminating against bought
blood in favor of gifted blood could also act as a proxy for unexpressed
discrimination on the basis of poverty and race. Given persistent
popular beliefs about the sociocultural meaning of blood, it was easy
to align safe blood with blood given from better-off replacement donors or voluntary Red Cross donors, and unsafe, diseased blood with
blood sold by down-and-outers.
It was as formal racial segregation of banked blood was ending
that a discussion in the medical literature about a possible correlation between “bought blood” and hepatitis spilled into the popular
press. In the 1950s and 1960s, doctors and the lay public became increasingly aware of the risk of transmission of hepatitis via blood
transfusion. 180 A Boston study published in 1959 that looked retrospectively at hepatitis cases in veterans’ hospitals between 1953 and
1957 showed a link between one for-profit blood bank and an increased incidence of transfusion-associated hepatitis in patients.181
But even as some correlation was shown, not all the evidence agreed.
The same Boston study showed no correlation between blood ob-

177. LEDERER, supra note 4, at 109-12; SWANSON, supra note 4, at 140; TUCKER, supra
note 25, at 117-18, 123-24.
178. See LEDERER, supra note 4, at 116-35; LOVE, supra note 132, at 141, 155-60, 19497; SWANSON, supra note 4, at 64-65; Thomas A. Guglielmo, “Red Cross, Double Cross”:
Race and America’s World War II-Era Blood Donor Service, 97 J. AM. HIST. 63 (2010); Phillip McGuire, Judge Hastie, World War II, and the Army’s Fear of Black Blood, 1 REV.
AFROAM. ISSUES & CULT. 134 (1979); Phillip McGuire, Judge William Henry Hastie and
Military Hemophobia, 1940-1943, 4 J. AFRO-AM. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL SOC’Y 127-35
(1983). Note that in parts of the United States, the civilian blood supply was never segregated; practices varied regionally.
179. LEDERER, supra note 4, at 123-29; Michael G. Kenny, A Question of Blood, Race,
and Politics, 61 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 456 (2006). The reformulation is discussed in
SWANSON, supra note 4, at 140-43.
180. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 145-46.
181. Calvin M. Kunin, Serum Hepatitis from Whole Blood: Incidence and Relation to
Source of Blood, 237 AM. J. MED. SCI. 293 (1959).
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tained from two other for-profit banks and hepatitis.182 In an era before any test for hepatitis, the best way to know if an asymptomatic
supplier would transmit hepatitis was whether his or her blood had
transmitted it before. Professional donors, as repeat suppliers, could
therefore be considered “clean” donors, tested in the most reliable
way possible—after their first donation, that is. Still, better-off Americans preferred to receive a “premium vintage” when they needed a
blood transfusion, leading to organizations such as a suburban Chicago blood co-op, where white matrons and businessmen gave blood
in exchange for free blood if needed, allowing them to avoid the potentially contaminated blood from the inner city where blood sellers
were recruited from within the African American community.183
By the 1960s, American doctors and the lay public were rethinking
the relationship between blood as a body product and the market and
coming to divide blood according to what would become known as the
gift/commodity dichotomy. The focus on “free blood” versus “paid blood”
of the blood bank battles, in which the role of the market in managing
blood supplies was emphasized as a virtue, was being exchanged for a
focus on gifted versus “bought blood,” in which treating blood like cash
was a vice. The key transaction that separated good blood from bad,
pure from impure, was the transaction with the supplier. The moral
valence of buying blood, a way of maintaining blood supplies used by
almost all blood banks some of the time, was changing.
From the perspective of property theory, the concept of body products as civic property-in-action had become nearly lost. Assuming
that all property must be market property, but rejecting market
property as the appropriate category in order to avoid legal consequences, doctors and lawmakers alike considered the options of market-inalienability (getting rid of paid suppliers) and non-property (the
blood shield laws) as the best ways of managing the relationship between body products and markets.
It was in this context that British sociologist Richard Titmuss
published The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy
in 1971. 184 Titmuss offered a framework for understanding and critiquing the American blood supply that proved broadly engaging.185
His analysis, firmly rooted in a market property perspective, articulated the gift/commodity dichotomy and the standard narrative in
Id. at 298.
Aurora Blood Co-op Stocks Premium Vintage, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1969, at W9.
TITMUSS, supra note 15 (first publication in UK, 1970; in US, 1971).
See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, Blood, 24 PUB. INT. 86 (1971); Clark C. Havighurst, Trafficking in Human Blood: Titmuss (1970) and Products Liability, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1-2 n.2, 2 n.5 (2009) [hereinafter Havighurst, Trafficking]; Paul A. Samuelson,
Blood, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1971, at 94; Seven Books of Special Significance Published in
1971, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1971.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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popularly accessible language. He placed gifts in opposition to commodities, describing a divide that separated not only safe blood from
unsafe blood, but also adequate supplies from scarcity and a nation
bound together through civic altruism from a society corroded by the
invasion of the market into personal relationships. Titmuss emphasized the corruptive harms of blood sales, arguing that blood sales, by
reducing body products to dollars and cents, diminished altruistic
gifting, which harmed both personhood and social bonds.186 His critique offered both an explanation for American concerns about the
adequacy and safety of the blood supply (reliance on paid suppliers)
and a policy recommendation (switch to an all-donor supply). His
book helped cement the focus on supplier payment in the law, policy,
and practice of body product exchange.
The medical professionals who oversaw blood banks moved quickly
via self-regulation to respond to public fears surrounding “bad blood”
and to undercut Titmuss’ criticism. Without any legal ban, the professional whole blood donor virtually vanished. While banks continued to
purchase some extremely rare blood types, less than three percent of
whole blood came from paid suppliers by 1976.187 By the late 1970s,
blood was no longer a “personal resource,” but a “gift of life,” firmly
placed on the morally correct side of the gift/commodity divide.
The gift/commodity dichotomy and the explanatory moral hierarchy based on supplier compensation were also adopted as the framework for analyzing other body product exchange. The dichotomy,
with its assumption of market property and emphasis on marketinalienability as the preferred policy, was quickly applied to milk as
the long tradition of buying and selling human milk was replaced by
a gift model. By the 1970s and 1980s, the milk supplier as the recipient of “double charity” in the form of cash and other compensation
was shunned, as bottled milk too became a precious gift, the “milk of
human kindness,” for which milk bankers neither paid nor
charged.188 Nursing mothers who supplied milk were paid, not in
cash, but in the “satisfaction of helping give other babies a chance for
a better life, perhaps even a chance for life itself.” 189 Despite the past
history of mothers’ milk stations as institutions deliberately organized to enhance the health of suppliers via payment, the newlyfounded Human Milk Banking Association of North America argued
that paying women for their milk threatened the health of the sup-

186. TITMUSS, supra note 15, at 263-64.
187. Id. at 124; Oversight on Implementation of National Blood Policy, 1979, Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research, Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 2 (June 7, 1979).
188. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 168, 177, 187-88.
189. Donors Needed, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1973, at 11.
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plier, her baby, and recipients. 190 Although there is no federal law
banning sales of breast milk in the twenty-first century, both nonprofit and for-profit milk banks mimicked blood banks and relied on
unpaid donation until the opening of Mother’s Milk Cooperative. 191
As described in Part II, the dominance of the dichotomy in legal
and medical thought by the 1980s caused the development of human
organs as body products to follow a different path than had blood and
milk decades earlier. When Dr. H. Barry Jacobs publicized plans to
create an organ brokerage that, similar to the first milk stations and
blood banks, would rely on cash to suppliers to obtain organs as
property-in-action that could then be allocated in the discretion of the
owning doctor, Congress moved rapidly to pass NOTA.192 By the early
1980s, such marketization was not seen as a way of promoting access
to treatment through the expert and beneficent hand of the doctor, as
it had been under a civic property perspective, but rather as commodification into market property that threatened a range of free market
horrors, from the poor selling themselves to the rich, to a society in
which civic altruism of all sorts was reduced as citizens refused to act
for the benefit of others without payment. With body products understood as market property, in action and at law, as new body products
such as bone marrow, faces, and eggs have been developed through
further medical experimentation, each such product has been created
and exchanged, and its use debated, from within the framework of
the gift/commodity dichotomy.
VI. BEFORE AND AFTER THE DICHOTOMY
The history of body products as property-in-action and later as
property-at-law simultaneously denaturalizes the gift/commodity dichotomy in its contemporary form and suggests alternatives. Since
the late twentieth century, the focus of the law and policy of body
products has been supplier compensation, aimed at separating suspect market commodities from altruistic beneficent gifts. But history
shows that this now-standard narrative supplanted an earlier narrative explaining the dichotomy as between suspect socialist gifts and
democratic capitalist commodities, with recipient payment as the key
feature. Further, both these narratives arose out of the adoption of
the “bank” metaphor, created in a context in which the gift versus
sale dichotomy did not exist at all, but instead, all the focus was on
allocation based on need rather than on ability to pay.
190. Arnold & Lockhart Borman, supra note 54, at 143-44.
191. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 193-95.
192. LEDERER, supra note 4, at 98-99; Gross, supra note 27, at 178-88; Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 (1985). Many states have
enacted their own versions of NOTA as well. Rao, supra note 12, at 376 n.58.
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The practices of the medical profession during the first half of the
twentieth century demonstrate that doctors understood market exchanges of body products as means, not ends, and initially did not
attach moral weight to the distinction between gift or sale, free or
paid. They did not understand marketization of body products as
necessarily antithetical to concern with the flourishing of either suppliers or recipients, such that market inalienability needed to be enforced by norm or by law. 193 Rather, to those doctors inclined to think
broadly about their roles in improving the overall health of those
with limited resources, marketization appeared to be a possible
means of promoting such flourishing. In their understanding, the
propertization of disembodied body materials and their transfer for
cash could promote three professional aims that they believed advanced the public good: first, maintaining a safe and adequate supply
of body products that they could use to care for patients; second, using their expertise to pick candidates for treatment rather than allowing the market to decide who received treatment; and third, when
possible, considering how healthy suppliers of body products might
not only be induced to provide needed therapeutics, but also how the
suppliers might be included as beneficiaries of the medical expertise
of the doctors who bought their body products. By an analysis focused
on propertization rather than marketization, this early understanding of body products as property-in-action is revealed as a medical
version of the civic property tradition, in contrast to the narrower
understanding of property as market property, triumphant in law
and property theory by the 1970s.
Both property theory and the possibilities of body product exchange have developed since the pre-World War II era when human
milk and blood was first bought and sold as medical property-inaction. As Alexander has demonstrated, the civic property tradition
has persisted, but it has also changed since its eighteenth-century
dominance when it was linked to visions of a republic anchored by
land ownership. 194 Alexander and numerous others have worked in
the last several decades to consider alternatives to market property
for the twenty-first century. This progressive property movement can
be understood as a descendant of civic property or property-aspropriety, revamped to reflect over two centuries of legal and social
change and seeking to develop an overarching vision of its normative
193. While necessarily based on different evidence and a historical record that makes
the viewpoints of the medical profession more accessible than those of suppliers and patients, this investigation thus reinforces recent sociological research demonstrating that
turn-of-the-twenty-first-century participants in body product exchange fail to perceive their
actions in selling and gifting as two mutually exclusive categories, ALMELING, supra note
13, at 127-33, and base their perceptions on a complex of institutional practices that vary
among procurement organizations, HEALY, supra note 13, at 113.
194. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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conception of the public good, based, for example, in democracy, pluralism, and social obligation. 195 Understanding the standard narrative as a historical artifact, rather than a universal truth, we can relinquish the body product exceptionalism which has been fostered by
the gift/commodity dichotomy and bring body products into this creative conversation about the purposes of property by considering them
both as property and as market commodities. Without turning back
the clock, it is possible to draw upon history to think beyond the dichotomy and standard narrative about the law and policy of body
product exchange in order to address current injustices. While leaving the development of a full theory of body property for further
work, this Part identifies the possibilities of such theorizing created
by recognizing historical facts on the ground and remembering medical visions of the purposes of this new property. 196

A. Recognizing Historical Facts on the Ground
The creation and use of body products as property-in-action in the
first decades of the twentieth century drew upon two assumptions:
that body products were property and that, as property, they could be
traded in markets in which suppliers were compensated, at least in
some circumstances. Through the actions of participants in body
product creation and exchange, these assumptions were not just hypothetical; they were facts on the ground. In the decades since the
entrenchment of the gift/commodity dichotomy, these assumptions
have been contentious on both philosophical and pragmatic
grounds. 197 Without reiterating these past debates, it is valuable to
note the insights these historical facts on the ground bring to these
discussions by allowing us to analyze body products as property and
to reexamine our moral intuitions about bodies and markets while
also remaining mindful of past failures.

1. Remembering Body Products as Property-in-Action
Despite the reluctance of courts in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries to recognize property rights in bodies and body
products, body products have been property-in-action in the hands of
doctors, suppliers, and patients since their creation as medical therapeutics. Further, body products as property-in-action are not merely
195. Rosser, supra note 17, at 108-111; id. at 110 (describing the “overlapping but not
identical alternative visions” within progressive property).
196. For a recent approach to theorizing bodies (including body products) as property,
see Render, supra note 14.
197. See supra Parts II and III; see also Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 259 (1994); Munzer, Special Case, supra note
21; Rao, supra note 12, at 365-66 n.15, 453, 455 (literature review and her own argument).
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a historical curiosity. In the absence of controlling law on the issue,
Americans continue to treat disembodied body products as property,
property they treat as belonging ab initio to its suppliers, who assume their right to sell or give it away, and then of the subsequent
possessor, who has the right to use, resell, or donate such products.
The assumption drives Internet-facilitated exchanges of body products, both sales and gifts. While Mother’s Milk Cooperative, founded
in 2013, has only recently begun to buy breast milk for processing
and resale to the Medolac Corporation, manufacturer of shelf-stable
breast milk, nursing mothers have been selling their breast milk directly to purchasers at whatever price the market will bear on the
Internet for years. 198 Websites also facilitate what they call “milk
sharing,” uncompensated donation of milk.199 While NOTA bans offering compensation for organs, the desperately ill and their families
assume others can transfer possession of their kidneys and advertise
for living donors.200 Websites designed to facilitate matching of those
interested in donating kidneys with those seeking these body products, like those designed for milk sharing, allow suppliers and recipients to transfer ownership rights in disembodied body products,
propertizing these body products even when money is not exchanged.
Thus, outside of the courtroom, Americans have been treating
body products as property for more than one hundred years. As I argued in Part V, courts and legislators adopted the approach of denying property status to body products in order to protect them from
the invisible hand of the market, based on the assumption that as
property, they must be market property in its most restrictive
sense. 201 A historical understanding of body products and their relationship to markets provides evidence to undercut that assumption
and bolster arguments that market exchanges are not always harmful. Recognizing the gift/commodity dichotomy as a historical artifact
and the standard narrative as a reaction to a particular political and
social context that does not describe universal or inevitable qualities
198. Judy Dutton, Liquid Gold: The Booming Market for Human Breast Milk, WIRED
(May 17, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.onlythebreast.com/articles/liquid-gold-the-boomingmarket-for-human-breast-milk/ [https://perma.cc/FR8U-8MVW]; NCBA CLUSA, Member
News Service, supra note 47; Iowa Woman Takes Out Ad to Sell Her Breast Milk, USA
TODAY (Nov. 4, 2007, 8:22 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/offbeat/2007-11-04breastmilk-sale_N.htm [https://perma.cc/4KSX-E97T].
199. See, e.g., EATS ON FEETS, http://www.eatsonfeets.org [https://perma.cc/M678-SR2B];
HUMAN MILK 4 HUMAN BABIES, http://www.hm4hb.net/ [https://perma.cc/3V56-6LG5]; Breastmilk Donation, MILKSHARE, http://milkshare.birthingforlife.com/ [https://perma.cc/25N5-L7TA].
200. See, e.g., Living Donors Online!, INT’L ASS’N OF LIVING ORGAN DONORS, INC.,
http://www.livingdonorsonline.org/index.htm [https://perma.cc/8ZSA-CNXA]; LIVING
KIDNEY DONOR SEARCH, http://www.livingkidneydonorsearch.com/how-to-be-listed-here/
[https://perma.cc/9M9Z-DXJE] (suggesting anyone needing a kidney should be on Facebook as
a strategy for finding a donor).
201. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-89 (Cal. 1990).
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of body products renders the need to craft a special set of nonproperty doctrines for body products less pressing. Rather than allowing a gap between the law and the practice of body product exchange to remain by keeping body products outside the law of property, we can instead consider how property-in-action can inform property-at-law. Body products need not remain an exception to discussions about the plural ends of property, both public and private.

2. Reexamining Moral Intuitions
To bring body property into these discussions, it is also necessary
to face our “strong moral intuitions” against body product markets,
acknowledging these views as historically created intuitions that
have promoted body product exceptionalism. Given the layers of philosophical, religious, and pragmatic concerns that underlie those intuitions, as well as a current sociopolitical context that includes high
income disparity, entrenched racism, and lack of consensus on
healthcare financing, reconsidering those intuitions sufficiently to
change the conversation about body product exchange is not a simple
matter. Considering historical examples of body product markets can
help by disrupting a blanket condemnation of all markets, in all
products, in all circumstances, and thus opening the way for a more
nuanced consideration.
For example, comparing the early mothers’ milk stations to current milk banks provides a forceful reminder that not all markets are
the same and that it is possible to create a managed market in a renewable body product. As discussed in Part V, since its founding in
1986, the Human Milk Banking Association of North America has
maintained the position that suppliers should not be paid. 202 Despite
frequent shortages of banked milk, requiring the Association to develop guidelines for the ethical allocation of milk among needy babies, the Association “does not condone, and in fact, questions the
practice of buying and selling human milk as a commodity.”203 The
Association explains that offering money for milk would risk harm to
suppliers’ infants because it would provide an incentive for a woman
to sell milk needed by her own child and also harm recipients because suppliers would be motivated to adulterate milk to increase
payments. Yet the Association explains its goals for its member institutions in much the same terms as Talbot and his colleagues did a
century ago: the “collection and distribution” of milk “in a safe, ethical and cost effective manner.” 204 The early doctors, however, did not
perceive buying and selling milk as unethical and established institu202. HUMAN MILK BANKING ASS’N OF N. AM., supra note 54.
203. Id. at 1.
204. Id.

250

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:193

tions that used such cash exchanges as a means toward achieving
their articulated goals of both providing milk to all babies who needed it and of improving the health of suppliers’ infants, while also focusing on safety and cost-effectiveness.
As Alexander has repeatedly explained, taking a broad view of
property allows rejection of a laissez faire market in a commodity
without being anti-market or requiring complete market inalienability. 205 Regulation of a body product market, like regulation of other
markets, can be directed to ensure that “the market, to the extent
that it is deemed to conflict with or to threaten the social good, be
subordinated to the latter.” 206 Twenty-first-century unregulated sales
of breast milk via the Internet can be considered a laissez faire market. While harms to sellers’ children are as yet undocumented, there
is evidence that this market offers risk to recipients due to high bacterial counts in milk purchased directly from suppliers, a risk milk
banks minimize by discarding milk with bacterial counts over a certain threshold and by pasteurizing the milk.207 There is also evidence
that such purchased breast milk is sometimes adulterated with cows’
milk. When turn-of-the-twentieth-century physicians created managed markets, they used supplier payment to guard against the
harms now identified by the Association. Payment not only helped
keep supplies adequate and allowed doctors to ensure that the sellers
had “good standards of living and relief from financial worry,” 208 but
also purchased compliance with surveillance of supplier and her baby. Medical examinations of seller and her baby, and the requirement
that milk be expressed on site under the watchful eye of the station
nurse, minimized the risks of a seller depriving her own baby, adulterating her milk, using unsanitary protocols, or hiding a dangerous
medical condition. The Mother’s Milk Cooperative offers another
model by which a market in human milk could be managed; the Cooperative is an organization in which suppliers are also part-owners,
which accordingly gives suppliers some stake in the market value,
and hence the quality, of the milk the co-op sells. 209
205. Gregory S. Alexander, Property as Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667, 669 (1998)
[hereinafter Alexander, Property as Propriety].
206. Id.
207. Sarah A. Keim et al., Microbial Contamination of Human Milk Purchased Via the
Internet, 132 PEDIATRICS 1227, 1227-34 (2013); see also Sarah A. Keim et al., Cow’s Milk Contamination of Human Milk Purchased Via the Internet, 135 PEDIATRICS e1157, e1157-61 (2015).
208. Comm. on Mothers’ Milk, supra note 118.
209. Note that the Co-op has only one buyer, a for-profit company that markets
processed human milk to hospitals. Press Release, Medolac Laboratories Announces the First Large Scale Purification of Human Milk Oligosaccharides (HMO), (Oct.
9, 2014), http://www.medolac.com/uploads/8/8/1/4/8814177/medolac_hmo_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PZN-VXZB]. A similar cooperative model, however, could be used to
create an institution that, like HMBANA banks, supplies milk to multiple hospitals as well
as to individual families.
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Given the fall from grace of blood selling, it is useful to remember
that cash payments for blood have also been used to increase the
safety of the blood supply. As discussed in Part V, at mid-century,
before there was a reliable test for hepatitis, paid suppliers, as repeat
suppliers, could be the least risky sources of blood. The same correlation between paid suppliers and safer blood had occurred earlier. In
the pre-World War II era, when blood-borne hepatitis was still unknown, one of the most dangerous known blood-borne diseases was
syphilis. Although there was a blood test, doctors knew that it was
possible for a recently-infected supplier to have undetectable levels in
the blood, yet to transmit the disease to a recipient. The safest course
was to conduct a genital examination, searching for signs of fresh infection. Registered professional donors were required to undergo such
examination as part of their periodic medical examinations. When
the Red Cross began to solicit the public at large for the wartime
blood program, however, this type of examination was dropped, considered too insulting to the altruistic donors who were giving without
compensation.210 Measured by the risk of syphilis infection, then,
gifted blood became less safe than bought blood.
The history of buying blood also demonstrates that money can be
used to attract suppliers who are primarily motivated by altruism,
not just those desperate for cash.211 The Mayo Clinic, faced with a
growing need for blood in its hospitals, but located in the small city of
Rochester, Minnesota, used replacement donors and unpaid donors,
but also routinely paid suppliers in the post-war period. The Clinic
blood bank developed a special category of church donors, groups who
could be counted on to provide a known number of suppliers who
drove in from a distance at set intervals to sell their blood. Eventually, the Clinic had a waiting list of churches wanting to get accepted
into its program, by which congregants could raise money for their
religious organization. 212 Blood selling in this way became a “double
charity,” with sellers benefitting both unknown patients and a nonprofit community institution that was important to them.
In the twenty-first century, moremarrowdonors.org proposed a
“double charity” model of supplier compensation to increase the
number and genetic diversity of bone marrow suppliers, who join a
registry of those willing to supply marrow in the future when their
genetic profile is found to match that of a patient. 213 Moremarrowdonors.org wanted to offer a set amount of compensation to suppliers,
210. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 77.
211. For recent evidence of the possibility of cash compensation as a means of increasing the blood supply, see Nicola Lacetera et al., Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood Donations, 340 SCI. 927 (2013).
212. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 144.
213. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2012).
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with payment received at the time of harvesting in the form of a
rental subsidy, scholarship, or a donation to a charity of the supplier’s choice. Troubled both by the scarcity of donors and the extra difficulty patients of non-European American ancestry have in finding a
match, the organizers designed a managed market to increase the
chance of matches for all patients in need. Knowing that race follows
class in the United States, they deliberately sought to recruit suppliers from socioeconomic classes to whom rent subsidies or tuition
money would be a charity, i.e., needed and appreciated funds to improve the seller’s quality of life. By including the option of compensating suppliers by a charitable donation, they also sought to recruit
potential suppliers like the Minnesotan church groups, those who
would be motivated to sell a body product in order to benefit one unknown individual and an organization important to them. While the
Mayo Clinic was free to establish its church blood seller program in
the 1950s, the managed market proposed by moremarrowdonors.org
was opposed by the federal government as a violation of the ban on
supplier compensation under NOTA. Despite limited success in the
courts, moremarrowdonors.org has not yet implemented its plan.214

3. Proven Market Dangers
Remembering past successful managed body product markets
needs to be tempered with reminders of failure. In Kansas City in the
1960s, doctors were rightfully wary, not of blood sales so much as of
for-profit blood banks. The low quality of the administration of those
banks gave rise to legitimate concerns about the standards for supplier screening and blood processing, and thus about risks to recipients. There is ample evidence in the historical record that when institutions managing a body product market take a narrow view of a
body product as a means of profit maximization, there are worrisome
incentives to cut corners in ways that are risky to both suppliers and
recipients. The market can “conflict with or . . . threaten the social
good,” and individual actors, given the opportunity to make a profit,
do not always subordinate their profit to the social good. 215
Some for-profit blood banks, like one bank identified in the Boston
study, supplied blood much more likely to contain hepatitis because
they recruited paid suppliers from populations with high rates of intravenous drug use, correlated with hepatitis infection. Other forprofit banks have relabeled blood to sell it past its expiration date.216
214. See id. at 864-65; Press Release, Shaka Mitchell, Government Set to Ration Lifesaving Donations, (Nov. 26, 2013), http://moremarrowdonors.org/government-set-to-ration-

life-saving-donations/ [https://perma.cc/BL6Z-PHZ3].
215. Alexander, Property as Propriety, supra note 205, at 669.
216. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 144-45.
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Such prioritization of profit maximization could risk injury to suppliers as well as to recipients, as some early for-profit donor registries
allegedly “bled [their registrants] white,” allowing too frequent donations in order to increase their commissions. 217
Yet it is not payment to suppliers that causes the medical risks,
but rather the decisions of administrators. During the same period
that several for-profit banks were found to be engaging in risky practices, the Salt River Blood Bank, a non-profit community blood bank
supplying much of the southwest, found that it could more cheaply
maintain an adequate supply by paying repeat suppliers to appear at
regular intervals, rather than spending money recruiting less reliable
unpaid suppliers. Using the same supplier screening and blood processing procedures as other AABB banks that preferred replacement
donors, the Salt River Blood Bank had an equivalent blood safety
record to banks that used few or no paid suppliers. 218
Administrator failures cannot always be avoided by regulation. In
New York City, despite detailed municipal regulation of blood sellers
early in the history of blood transfusion, fly-by-night donor registries
with substandard treatment of suppliers were a problem before the
transition to blood banks, and city hospitals continued to struggle
with unusually severe problems with blood scarcity and safety
through the postwar period. 219
This history, while not one of unqualified success, challenges our
moral intuitions that body products need to be treated exceptionally
in action and at law. These historical facts on the ground, that body
products have long been property-in-action and property traded in
markets, disprove the standard narrative. Like other forms of property, body products can be exchanged with and without compensation.
They can be treated as market property in its narrowest sense, sold
simply to make a profit, but they can also be treated by suppliers,
recipients, and brokering institutions in broader terms. They can be
exchanged directly or through for-profit or non-profit institutions.
Exchanges can be unregulated, self-regulated, or formally regulated
at the city, state, or federal level. Remembering the civic property
tradition reminds us that what doctors once called “therapeutic merchandise” is not the only category of property recognized and exchanged to serve both private and public ends. 220 There is no single
narrative to explain all body property any more than there is a single
narrative that can unify all property into a grand narrative. Recog217. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 45; Noah Fabricant & Leo M. Zimmerman, The Cry for
Blood, 17 HYGEIA 881, 884 (1939).
218. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 113, 146-47.
219. Id. at 45, 106, 145.
220. James A. Tobey, A New Foster-Mother, 7 HYGEIA 1110, 1110 (1929).
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nizing the pluralism of body products as property permits thinking
beyond the dichotomy, combining historical facts with contemporary
property theory to address the creation, allocation, and exchange of
body products today.

B. Remembering Medical Visions
If we accept that body products are property and that they can be
market-alienable property without necessarily being market property
in its narrowest sense, the question then becomes how to incorporate
body property within the law of property and markets. What purposes of property can be served by recognizing and regulating these
forms of property? What is the appropriate role of law in limiting and
facilitating the creation and allocation of body products? Both the
historical record and the recent scholarly literature are rich with examples of ways to create and allocate such products. 221 The challenge
remains, just as it was a century ago, to manage a particularly tricky
supply chain dependent on human bodies in ways that promote the
just and fair creation and allocation of these medical therapeutics.
History provides not only facts on the ground, but also an implicit
theoretical framework as a way of evaluating propertization and
marketization of body products. What I have called a medical version
of the civic property perspective can be used to inspire our future
thinking about body products, law, and markets to answer those
questions. The civic property tradition allows us to consider body
products as market-alienable property without abandoning them to
the free market. In the classic version of that tradition from the earliest years of our republic, the challenge of such an approach is twofold: to formulate a normative vision of the public good that such
property should promote and against which body product law may be
measured, and then to craft laws to promote that vision. In the context of contemporary property theory, we might phrase the challenge
as treating body products as property that can be exchanged in ways
that “relate[] multiple public and private values . . . as coherent and
mutually supportive.” 222
The public good or public values that body property might promote
can and should be considered from the perspective of property generally, as theorists have done since Radin’s earliest work on contested
commodities. As discussed in Part III, my aim is to join the tradition
of property and commodification theorists who have placed human
221. See supra note 48.
222. Alexander, Property’s Ends, supra note 16, at 1260. In the context of body property managed by institutional middlemen, such as “banks,” it is also particularly useful to
consider the creation of institutions of property, and property as institutions. HANOCH
DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS xii-xiii, 3-75 (2011).
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flourishing at the center of their analysis, while considering the joint
private and public ends of property. But as we consider body products
specifically, their history can provide useful, if insufficient, starting
points for articulating particular ways that their propertization and
marketization can promote human flourishing.
The doctors who first created body product supply chains did not
discuss their practices in terms of property or law. Their guiding
principles were more implicit than explicit and were drawn from
medical professional ethics. Doctors first all wanted to save patients
by using their expertise, and thus created these new therapeutics,
which immediately required them to consider the problem of a safe
and adequate supply. For some doctors, their ability to treat all patients in need was also a significant part of their professional identity
and ethic, such that they sought to manage body product supplies to
that goal. The necessity of managing human suppliers led some doctors, like Talbot and the blood bank administrators at the Mayo Clinic, to think in even broader terms about their ability to benefit suppliers as well as recipients, developing a “double charity” model of
body product supply management. Based on these medical practices,
I have identified historical interlocking goals for body product supply
management that together suggest a starting point for thinking
about the public ends of body products as private property: (i) to generate adequate and safe supplies of body products for use in medical
treatment; (ii) to provide body products to all recipients who need
them, not just those who can afford to pay; and (iii) to provide compensation to suppliers sufficient to encourage repeat donation, gain
compliance with safety-related measures, and, in some instances, to
promote the health and well-being of the suppliers themselves.
From these practices, we can articulate a generalized vision of the
public good to be served by body product purchase and sale as ensur-

ing efficient access to safe body products by all who need them for
medical care and promoting a society in which overall health and
well-being is enhanced. This vision combines a normative view of

health care allocation (based on need rather than ability to pay) with
a normative position that body supply management can be considered part of public health promotion, rather than solely a means of
providing individual treatment.
Using this vision as the basis of the law and policy of body product
management forces a shift in the perspective of regulation from the
means of body product creation (sale or gift) to the ends of body products (patient treatment and public health). The difference can be
seen by measuring existing laws and policies against this articulation. Today, almost no whole blood is purchased from suppliers in the
United States. While black markets in organs exist, most transplants
in the United States are performed using organs harvested from un-
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compensated living or cadaveric donors. These policies were enacted
to promote safety and a society in which overall health and wellbeing was enhanced by avoiding harms to sellers and recipients. As
shown by the increasing scarcity of organs, however, NOTA has
failed to achieve the goal of efficient access to body products for all
who need them. Further, the self-imposed ban on paid blood suppliers in response to fears of hepatitis did not keep the blood supply safe
when another undetectable transmissible disease was recognized:
AIDS. 223 In fact, the blood shield laws that declared banked blood
non-property decreased legal incentives for blood bankers to guard
against dangers in the blood supply, arguably slowing the adoption of
steps to reduce the risk of transfusion-acquired AIDS. 224 A regulatory
focus on payment to sellers and a refusal to consider banked blood as
a “good” has greatly limited supplier payment for blood and organs,
at least within the United States. But it has failed to ensure a safe
supply for all who need these therapeutics, the original goal of these
policies. In contrast, the suggested “double charity” approach of supplier compensation by moremarrowdonors.org addresses safety and
scarcity concerns in a manner that the organizers believe will promote the overall health and well-being in society by increasing fairness in access to donor marrow. The study they seek to carry out, to
measure the effect of their proposed compensation scheme, offers the
potential for data useful to craft regulation designed to “mutually
support” public and private ends of body product marketization. 225
If we, like the organizers of moremarrowdonors.org, reject the
gift/commodity dichotomy, thinking about body products as propertyin-action within the civic property tradition helps identify missed opportunities and new possibilities. For example, in Part IV, I explained how milk sellers in the 1930s and 1940s received not only
cash payment, but also free medical examinations for themselves and
their babies, supplemental nutrition in the form of cow’s milk, and
training on infant care. The presence of the selling mothers in medically-run milk stations to express milk was seized as an opportunity
to provide follow-up care to new mothers and infants, what later public health experts would call well-baby care. Doctors used these additional forms of compensation to help ensure that milk selling was not
only non-health-threatening, but rather, health-promoting. Could a
223. See HEALY, supra note 13, 88, 92, 94-95, 101-06; SUSAN RESNIK, BLOOD SAGA:
HEMOPHILIA, AIDS, AND THE SURVIVAL OF A COMMUNITY 113-36 (1999); STARR, BLOOD,
supra note 175, at 266-98; Thomas H. Murray, The Poisoned Gift: AIDS and Blood, in A
DISEASE OF SOCIETY: CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO AIDS 205, 216-23 (Dorothy Nelkin et al. eds., 1991).
224. See Clark C. Havighurst, Legal Responses to the Problem of Poor-Quality Blood,
in BLOOD POLICY: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 21, 21-23 (David B. Johnson ed., 1977); Havighurst, Trafficking, supra note 185, at 7; Kessel, supra note 41, at 276-79.
225. Mitchell, supra note 214.
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similar approach be used with more risky forms of body product supply, combining the goals of a safe and adequate supply for patients
with the promotion of overall health by caring for suppliers? 226
Moremarrowdonors.org wants to experiment with compensation in
the form of financial benefits, but we could also consider non-cash
compensation designed to promote the public health. In the 1950s, a
pint of blood earned some suppliers free blood for themselves and
their immediate families for a year, if needed, through blood assurance programs.227 Similar schemes have been suggested for organ donation, such as providing preferential positions on the waiting lists to
previous living donors. 228 These historical examples help us to evaluate current proposals, reminding us to consider how supplier compensation schemes could be shaped not only to obtain an adequate
and safe supply, but also as opportunities to intervene in the health
of suppliers and/or their families in the service of broader public
health goals.
As we remember these prior medical visions, it is also important
to consider why the actions of early twentieth-century doctors are
useful, but insufficient, as a basis for the important project of theorizing and regulating body property. While those actions provide positive examples, they also were constrained by the self-interest and
self-regard of the medical profession and of individual doctors. Doctors assumed their right and ability to buy and sell body products
and also assumed that medical professional discretion was the best
tool for allocating such supplies and medical treatment generally.
Mothers’ milk stations, for example, reflected the gender and class
assumptions of their white, male, well-educated founders. Blood
banks reflected the racism of the lay and medical public. For good
reasons, scholars and policy makers have long been leery of the idea
that doctors invariably act in the best interest of each patient or of
the public at large. 229 The battle of the blood banks clearly demonstrated that even within the medical community there was never a
universally recognized vision of the best way to create and manage a
body product supply. There is a significant difference between a general professional vision, even when based in expertise and public226. A related suggestion is the altruistic “intermediate” exchanges considered in Choi
et al., supra note 59, at 298-308.
227. SWANSON, supra note 4, at 109.
228. Choi et al., supra note 59, at 297.
229. The long history of medical experimentation provides numerous examples,
stretching at least as far back as early modern grave-robbing by medical students. See
supra note 30. For particularly notorious examples, consider Dr. J. Marion Sims, the fate of
cells taken from Henrietta Lacks, and the cells taken from John Moore. See supra notes 23,
35; see also SUSAN E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN
AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995); SUSAN M. REVERBY, EXAMINING
TUSKEGEE: THE INFAMOUS SYPHILIS STUDY AND ITS LEGACY (2009).
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mindedness, and the legislative processes of deliberation, participation, and rule-making that create formal law.
The medical visions I have traced, using blood and milk as examples, are also insufficient because body products vary. As discussed in
Part II, they vary in the risks of harvesting and in their benefits to recipients. A sick baby might be able to recover using an artificial formula or human milk, while a hemorrhaging patient might only survive
given a prompt transfusion. Organ transplants can extend lives for
years; donor gametes create new lives in being. Further, the historical
record shows that over time the demand for body products changes,
making (for example) the rough surveillance and control surgeons exercised over individual blood sellers in the 1910s and 1920s impossible
to maintain as the volumes used in each hospital increased, leading to
community blood banks. Systems based on professional norms and
ethics may break down when body product exchanges are occurring at
much higher volumes, at a distance, and/or via on-line exchanges. For
these reasons, the motivation and actions of Bernard Fantus in 1937
cannot be an unquestioned foundation for body product regulatory policy in 2017, nor can the tactics of milk market management be transferred unquestioned into kidney procurement.
Body product differences require that each body product should be
considered and regulated independently. These regulations can take
the form of body product specific legislation, like NOTA and blood
shield laws. Allowing body products to be recognized as property, and
property that is sometimes traded in markets, will also have ripple effects through the law, requiring the thoughtful interpretation of existing doctrines, in areas such as tort, contract, and tax law.230 As courts
draw upon existing common law doctrines and legislatures consider
statutory interventions, they can follow the lead of medical professionals by acknowledging that human-sourced therapeutics are property
that can and should be created and exchanged for a purpose broader
than each individual transaction and should be judged accordingly.
VII. CONCLUSION
Body property is now part of sociocultural and medical perceptions
of ourselves as a result of a biomedical worldview developed over the
last century. We believe there is valuable property in our bodies because we believe that we can be healed and enhanced by the application of biomedical science, a science that deconstructs and reconstructs
the body into a source of fungible materials. That belief, and that
promise, is what we foster by acknowledging such property within law.

230. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 37, at 717-18; Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans, supra
note 53; Milot, supra note 37; sources cited supra note 224.
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To that starting point, that body products advance our health, we
can add the ideal that healthcare should be allocated to those who
need it, rather than only, or preferentially, to those who can buy it.
This ideal remains a powerful strand within the American medical
community and within the public at large, although the best means
of implementing it remains highly contested in American politics.231
Even a blood bank administrator known for her ferocious opposition
to “free blood” in the Cold War era and for her dedication to running
her bank just like a financial bank maintained a sense that her institution was not just another business, but instead like “fire, police,
[and] trauma service,” that is, like community-financed organizations
available to whoever needs help, whenever they need help. 232 The
public good is implicated, as well as private needs.
The last century of experience with body products points the way
for rethinking body property and its ends. By denaturalizing the
gift/commodity dichotomy and rejecting the standard narrative, we
can remember that the treatment of body products as property does
not require the abandonment of the products themselves or their
suppliers to the free market. Neither does owning property sourced
from human bodies, and even exchanging such property in markets,
preclude the type of relations between people linked by bonds of generosity and gratitude. Keeping these lessons in mind, we can use
property law as a framework from which to regulate different types
of body product management organizations and exchanges. Some
body products might be best collected and allocated through democratizing institutions that increase access to a needed medical therapeutic to all those who could benefit by such treatment. Other body
products may be successfully managed through laissez faire institutions of capitalism that facilitate the transfer of medical therapeutics
to those willing to pay, as long as profiteering at the expense of supplier and recipient health is kept in check. The extent to which we
regulate a body product market should reflect the body product itself,
those who supply it, and those who use it, all guided by a positive vision of its use, rather than the blinders of the gift/commodity dichotomy or our prejudices and fears.

231. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (ruling on the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act); Mark A. Levine et al., Improving Access to
Health Care: A Consensus Ethical Framework to Guide Proposals for Reform, HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 14, 15-16 (2007).
232. HEMPHILL, supra note 154, at 69.
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